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ABSTRACT  
Firefighting is an inherently dangerous occupation involving numerous risk sources, unique 
contexts, multiple personnel and rapidly changing environments.  Firefighting operations are 
dynamic in nature yet require calculated risk taking and structured command to prevent the 
realisation of potentially catastrophic outcomes to both casualties and rescuers.  The notion of 
“dynamic risk management” is a term that has gained popularity throughout fire services 
worldwide, yet the process of dynamic risk management is typically poorly articulated.  This 
study demonstrates ‘dynamic risk management’ is a misnomer, with risk management being a 
defined process applied within the context of dynamic emergency response.  Failure to 
recognise this and respond accordingly may leave fire services exposed to adverse findings 
should adverse consequences be realised.  Further, this study tested the perceptions of risk held 
by incident controllers in the Department of Fire and Emergency Services in Western Australia 
against AS31000, through a combination of qualitative surveys and subsequent Bayesian 
analysis of reported adverse outcomes resulting from all hazards emergency response.  This 
study found significant variance in risk tolerance between incident controllers and to a lesser 
degree, variance in the understanding of risk as defined by AS31000.  Bayesian statistical 
analysis identified reportable adverse outcomes were almost certain to occur across the 
majority of firefighting activities, whilst potential worst case outcomes were rarely historically 
realised.  The results of this study demonstrate that it is critical for firefighting organisations to 
have documented risk thresholds and to provide greater education of risk management in 
dynamic situations to incident controllers of all ranks. 
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1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Emergency services personnel respond to thousands of dynamic emergency incidents across 
Australia each week.  As part of this response each incident controller must rapidly and 
correctly manage risk within the challenging and dynamic emergency environment.  Despite 
the intense pressures associated with risk management in these environments, little formal 
research has been completed to determine whether current risk management practices are 
compliant with International/Australian Standard 31000:2009 – Risk management principles 
and guidelines (AS31000). 
The primary objective of this study is to determine whether current risk management practices 
in dynamic emergency incidents within the Department of Fire and Emergency Services 
(DFES) in Western Australia are compliant with AS31000.  A subsequent objective is to define 
the internal context of dynamic risk management within the operational incident management 
and response section of DFES. 
In order to evaluate current practices within DFES, first a systematic review of internal and 
external literature is presented.  Next, the results of qualitative semi-structured interviews of 
participating incident controllers are analysed and compared with organisational literature and 
policies to determine current practices and define to the internal risk context applicable to the 
study group.  Finally, Bayesian statistical analysis of historical incident occurrence data is 
discussed to further define the internal risk context and to facilitate improved practice. 
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1.2 Significance of the Study 
This study is significant in that it is the first of its kind in Western Australia and potentially 
nationwide.  Results may not only serve to enhance risk management in dynamic emergency 
environments, but to also reduce the incidence of injury to responders through the 
harmonisation and documentation of risk tolerance and acceptable practice. 
 
1.3 Research Question 
Is risk management in dynamic emergency operations in the Western Australian fire and 
emergency service compliant with AS31000? 
 
1.4 Hypotheses 
Null Hypothesis (H0) 
Risk management during dynamic emergency operations in the Western Australian fire 
and emergency service is compliant with AS31000. 
Alternate Hypothesis (H1) 
Risk management during dynamic emergency operations in the Western Australian fire 
and emergency service is not compliant with AS31000. 
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2.0 The Literature 
2.1 The Standard of Risk Management 
Australian and international standards are collaboratively developed by subject matter experts, 
industry and other invested stakeholders in order to provide benchmarks for construction or 
processes.  When referenced by relevant local legislation these standards become mandatory, 
without such reference the standards serve the same purpose albeit only when adopted 
voluntarily by organisations.  One such standard is AS31000 which provides the architecture 
for the management of risk regardless of circumstance or consequence.  Failure by 
organisations or individuals to manage risk in accordance with AS31000 does not necessarily 
equate to adverse outcomes.  However, criticism and adverse finding may occur where 
AS31000 is not followed and an adverse outcome eventuates, especially where consequences 
are severe and may have been avoided.  In occupations involving rapidly changing and multiple 
risk sources, multiple personnel and the potential for the loss of life there is little margin for 
error in managing risk and consequently, compliance with AS31000 becomes vital.  This 
chapter examines risk in the context of firefighting operations.  
2.2 Defining Risk 
Risk and the process of risk management applicable to all situations are defined in detail within 
AS31000; SAHB 436:2013 Risk management guidelines – Companion to AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009 (SAHB 436); and SAHB 89:2013 Risk management – Guidelines on risk 
assessment techniques (SAHB 89).  Whilst the term ‘risk’ is often incorrectly used concurrently 
with or instead of the term ‘hazard’, risk is specifically defined as the “effect of uncertainty on 
objectives” (AS31000 s2.1).  Risk is not an event (SAHB 436, s2.1).  It is not an explosion, 
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fire or other emergency.  Risk cannot be expressed as either positive or negative, but rather as 
the likelihood of a consequence, positive or negative, occurring.  When applied to emergency 
response it is essential to appreciate that incidents are dynamic, occurring within an 
environment subject to constant change and therefore the level of uncertainty and therefore 
risk, must be constantly reassessed.   
 
Risk is often inappropriately described (SAHB 436).  To appropriately describe risk three 
elements must be specified: 
1. The objective(s) being referred to; 
2. The particular source of uncertainty; and 
3. How the source of uncertainty may lead to consequences. 
 
In the emergency response setting an example of a statement of risk may include: 
There is the potential that firefighters will have to rescue casualties involved in a high 
speed vehicle crash, which in turn will cause injury or harm to the firefighters from mechanical, 
thermal and chemical hazards preventing all firefighters completing the rescue unharmed. 
 
In this statement: 
1. The objective is firefighters completing the rescue do so unharmed; 
2. The source of uncertainty (risk source) is the vehicle rescue; and 
3. Exposure to mechanical, thermal and chemical hazards may lead to the 
consequences, i.e., firefighters getting injured. 
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From this example it becomes clear that during dynamic emergency incidents firefighters must 
be acutely aware of the objectives to be met in the first instance.  This requires comprehensive 
guidance at an organisational level to establish objectives well before an incident occurs.  
Although specific standing objectives may vary between fire services, the general objectives 
of the preservation of life, property and the environment are common between services.  These 
general objectives are typically not further defined.  Nor are overarching statements of risk 
evident in any of the Australian or international fire brigade literature that satisfies the criteria 
of SAHB 436.   
 
2.3 Risk Management and Managing Risk in Dynamic Situations 
‘Risk management’ refers to the structure (principles, framework and process) for managing 
risk effectively whilst ‘managing risk’ refers to the application of that structure to the decision 
making process (SAHB 436, s2.9).  Whilst DFES Directive 0.0 “The Fundamentals of DFES 
Operations” (date unknown) provides some guidance in relation to time poor decision making 
during emergency management and utilises the word “risk”, it provides no discussion or 
commentary as to the organisational definition of risk or risk management process.  The risk 
management process detailed in AS31000 (Figure 1) provides the architecture for decision 
making involving risk and must be applied in every situation, including emergency response, 
for risk to be deemed to have been considered sufficiently (SAHB 436, p44).    
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Figure 1: AS31000 Risk management process (AS31000, figure 1) 
 
 
SAHB 436 (s5.1.2) identifies the process of risk management and must be fully applied in 
every situation regardless of the complexity of the issues faced, the dynamic nature of the 
operating environment and the time available to make required decisions.  Further, SAHB 436 
(p45) provides the following example which may be interpreted as being directly applied to the 
firefighting context: 
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 “A military special forces section leader might have a split second in which to make a 
tactical decision on which personal wellbeing and that of subordinates as well as the 
success of the mission, might depend.  In that time the leader must recall the objectives, 
appreciate the external and internal environment, assess the risks, consider the options, 
review those against the objectives and take the appropriate action.  Despite the very short 
decision making window, the quality of each of these steps must be of the highest 
standard.” 
 
Failure to sufficiently understand risk or to apply the entire risk management structure to 
dynamic decision making in the emergency environment can result in decisions that exacerbate 
rather than mitigate adverse consequences.  Should adverse outcomes eventuate it may also 
lead to post incident scrutiny of the decisions made by incident controllers. Existing studies 
suggest risk assessment in accordance with AS31000 may not occur during frontline 
emergency response (Ash & Smallman, 2008; Sadler, Holgate & Clancy, 2007).  
 
 
The term ‘context’ applies to both the risk management framework (architecture) as well as the 
process of risk management.  In terms of architecture, the context includes both the external 
and internal environment in which the organisation or individual operates (SAHB 436, s2.8).  
In order to establish context effectively, it is necessary to clearly define both the objectives to 
be achieved and the parameters to be considered whilst managing risk.  Failure to clearly 
establish the context may lead to the entire risk management architecture and process being 
flawed as a consistent approach cannot be achieved.  The stages of establishing the context are 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: HB 436 Establishing the context. 
 
DFES (2013c) identified four primary objectives of the organisation as the preservation of life, 
property, critical infrastructure and the environment (in that order).  These objectives were 
found to be identical to those of other departments in both Australia and internationally (NZFS; 
2008, QFRS, 2008).  Further, DFES (2015d) identified the following objectives applied to 
certain operational incidents in the order they are listed: 
1. Rescue (effect rescue of human life); 
2. Exposures (prevent adjacent assets including houses and infrastructure becoming 
impacted by fire); 
3. Containment (contain the fire to the smallest area or structure possible); 
4. Extinguishment (extinguish the fire); 
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5. Overhaul (ensure the hazard is eliminated); 
6. Ventilate (removing smoke);  
7. Environment (protect the environment from the hazard and firefighting activities); and 
8. Salvage (prevent avoidable damage). 
 
 
Whilst no literature specific to the risk attitudes of firefighters in the Western Australian fire 
service exists, Fender’s (2003) American study identified the following objectives were 
common amongst career and volunteer firefighters: 
 Not to let fellow firefighter’s down; and 
 Live up to community expectations. 
 
These objectives appear to support the high personal risk threshold observed in firefighters as 
reported by Penney (2013) and Moore-Merrill et al. (2008) and discussed further in section 4 
of this report. 
 
 
The external environment includes regulatory or legislative requirements to be adhered to as 
well as community and political attitudes that directly influence the internal environment.  The 
external environment provides overall strategic parameters within which operations must 
remain to be deemed publicly acceptable and to be deemed lawful.  This helps define the 
architecture that governs the interpretation and application of the risk management process. 
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The internal environment includes organisational attitudes, the beliefs of the individual risk 
manager, and the specific purpose and setting for the particular application of the risk 
management process at a specific time and place.  Where organisational risk attitudes are not 
defined or communicated the individual risk manager inherently relies upon their own risk 
thresholds.   
 
 
Regardless of the nature or location of an emergency, firefighting remains an occupation and 
thereby subject to the same laws as any other workplace (Occupational Safety and Health Act, 
1984 - OSH Act).   Section 19 of the OSH Act details the requirements of employers to provide 
a safe work environment ‘so far as is practicable.’  Whilst certain exemptions are made for 
dangerous Police work under Section 4A of the OSH Act, no such exemptions exist for 
firefighters at fire, rescue or other related emergency incidents.  During firefighting operations 
it may be considered that the employer is actually the fire brigade Commissioner or other senior 
ranking officer who is unlikely to be physically present at the scene of an emergency incident.  
This does not exempt the employer from providing a safe workplace including safe systems of 
work and information, instruction and training (COSH, 2005).  Employees at the incident, in 
particular those in positions of command or control, also have responsibilities under Section 
20 of the OSH Act.  These responsibilities include taking: 
 “take all reasonable care –  
a) To ensure his or her own safety and health at work; and 
b) To avoid adversely affecting the safety or health of any other person through act 
or omission at work.” 
OSH Act s20 
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In considering whether an employee has met their duties under the OSH Act, courts consider 
how a ‘reasonable person’ may have acted in that particular case.  COSH (2005, p8) identifies 
that a value judgement “is made on the values of the society of the day” and the more a person 
is aware of associated risk, the greater their obligation to manage that risk.   
 
Fire brigade literature (DFES, 2013c) identifies that usual duties of operational officers involve 
performing risk assessments, safeguarding firefighters from harm and controlling operations at 
emergency incidents.  In Western Australia, the Department of Fire and Emergency Services 
(2013b) identifies Fire and Rescue Service firefighters as responsible for emergency response 
to: 
 road crash rescue; 
 structure fire; 
 bushfire; 
 chemical and hazardous material management including gas leaks; and 
 flood, storm or tempest. 
 
The literature indicates that firefighters and officers are professionals responsible for the 
response and management of a wide range of dangerous emergency incidents.  In consideration 
of the relevant legislation, firefighters and officers may be held to a higher obligation to provide 
a safe workplace during dynamic and dangerous situations. In order to achieve this as part of 
their normal work role they are provided with enhanced training and specialist equipment. 
 
In addition to the defined work role and specific focus on risk management during emergency 
response in dynamic situations, firefighters are also held in special regard by the community. 
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In the absence of formal research, popular commercial literature was reviewed to determine 
community opinion towards the firefighting profession.  A decade of national popular opinion 
polls (Flynn, 2014) identifies firefighters as being the second most trusted profession by the 
Australian community (the first being paramedics).  Whilst far from formal research, these 
public opinion polls demonstrate firefighters are held in high regard by the people they serve.  
The gravity of this external regard also serves to develop the internal context for firefighters 
on the ground in the form of pressure to make difficult decisions in order to live up to 
community expectations.   
 
 
The internal context as applied to firefighting may be divided into two distinct levels.  The first 
being the organisational attitudes, policies and operational frameworks that provide the 
structure for the fire service.  The second being the internal culture of the firefighting stations 
and crews themselves.   
 
Organisational culture is indoctrinated into firefighters from the first day they commence as 
trainees.  Discipline, obedience, calculated risk taking and teamwork are part of the founding 
traits imbedded into probationary firefighters by their instructors.  Development of these traits 
is supported by an overarching organisational attitude reflected in the manner training is 
administered, conducted and resourced.  Whilst an abundance of Australian fire service tactical 
training literature was located, a striking absence of Australian fire service risk ideology was 
identified.   
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other than that comprehensively detailed by the UK Fire Service (see section 2.4 of this report) 
was noted.  Internationally, the “Safe Person Concept” was identified in various forms (IFAC, 
2012, NFPA, 2013; NZFS, 2008) which partially defines risk attitudes amongst fire services.    
Summarised, the New Zealand fire service interpretation of the Safe Person Concept (NZFS, 
2008) is: 
“We may risk our safety, in a highly calculated manner, to protect saveable lives. 
We may risk our safety a little, in a very careful manner, to protect saveable property. 
We will not risk our safety for lives or property that are obviously lost.” 
 
Whilst these three sentences clearly articulate the risk attitudes and thresholds of the New 
Zealand Fire Service’s, further definition of the term “calculated” is not provided.  The absence 
of this definition suggests that a subjective and qualitative assessment may be considered 
acceptable by the fire service hierarchy in identified scenarios.  Whilst senior fire service 
hierarchy are unlikely to be present at an operational incident in all but the most extreme cases, 
the culture they create is carried within each operational person onto the incident ground and 
may be considered to have a significant impact on the way an incident controller manages risk. 
 
Perhaps the more intimate internal firefighter culture that affects risk management during 
emergency operations is the culture amongst firefighting crews.  Firefighters spend a 
significant amount of time together during both emergency incidents and routine station life 
(Childs, Morris & Ingram, 2004).  In this environment indoctrinated traits established by 
organisational culture invariably flourish and form a unique environment that has the capacity 
to directly influence an incident controller’s management of risk during dynamic emergency 
operations. 
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Firefighters have long been seen as “heroic, blue collar battlers” (Childs, Morris & Ingham, 
2004) where time honoured practices, as opposed to formal research and evidence based 
practice, have formed the basis for both strategic and tactical response by firefighters at the 
‘coal face.’  This reliance on traditional approaches and professional craft knowledge passed 
down through firefighter generations is viewed with pride amongst many firefighters (Penney, 
2013) and serves to build a strong culture and internal context of self-reliance and belief.  
 
Reports released by the National Interagency Fire Centre (1996) and Moore-Merrell et al. 
(2008)  identify an established culture of risk taking amongst firefighters in order ‘to get the 
job done’ regardless of operational guidelines.  This is supported by the findings of 
Kunadharaju, Smith and Dejoy (2011) who reported (in contrast to most high hazard work) 
firefighting operations are actively based on hazard engagement, typically compounded by 
acute time pressures.  However, Prochniak (2014), found firefighters are acutely aware of the 
fragility of time and life.  Further, Prochniak (2014, p257) found that “firefighters wishing to 
pursue a dangerous occupational task must plan their own behaviour, concentrate on the goal, 
and maintain a temporal distance from the task by focusing on a lack of time pressure.”   
 
Fender (2003) identified multiple firefighter specific traits that directly affected their risk 
tolerance.  These included: 
 The age of a victim -  the younger the victim the higher the threshold to personal 
injury or death; 
 Respect for the officer in charge – firefighters were willing to undertake more 
dangerous tasks if they respected the officer giving a command; 
 A sense of pride in taking risks; and 
 Expectations of the community. 
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A previous study into the decontamination practices of firefighters exposed to hazardous and 
toxic materials (Penney, 2013) also found a tendency amongst firefighters to perceive 
hazardous incidents as routine if they were encountered and completed without acute health 
effects becoming evident. 
 
As identified in the literature discussed in this section, firefighting is a unique profession that 
attracts a certain type of person with a natural tolerance to personal risk.  These personnel are 
then placed in dynamic and dangerous situations whilst surrounded by a culture of risky 
behaviour, arguably as a result of occupational necessity.  This environment is potentially 
further fuelled by the weight of perceived public expectation and human distress in traumatic 
circumstances.  Whilst this internal context may actually enhance the capacity of firefighters 
to complete the job required, it may also lead to behaviour that may be deemed to be 
inappropriate in accordance with the external context, especially when adverse outcomes 
eventuate.   
 
With the possible exception of community attitude, the external context applicable to the 
firefighting environment is the same as that applied to other workplaces.  As an employer, fire 
services are required to provide a safe workplace and supervisors have a legal duty of care to 
employees under their management.  Further, as fire services personnel are expected to work 
in critical, hazardous and dynamic environments (DFES, 2012a, 2012b, 2013b, 2015a, 2015b, 
2015d) it may be argued that fire service incident controllers have a greater duty of care to their 
crews than would be expected of other community members in that same situation.  The 
increased accountability of the external context must be compared to the effects of the internal 
context which supports risk taking behaviour with limited formal quantified guidance.   
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Whilst it is acknowledged that the dynamic emergency environment requires a significant 
amount of flexibility for incident controllers, the absence of formal guidance in the literature 
reviewed suggests a gap between external statutory requirements and internal expectations 
within fire services.  Awareness of the differences between external and internal contexts and 
how each may affect an incident controller’s perceptions and firefighter actions on the incident 
ground would likely only enhance the ability of an incident controller to better appreciate an 
emergency situation and enhance the management of associated risk.  This has the subsequent 
potential benefit of reducing firefighter injuries and fatalities as a consequence of occupational 
events. 
 
 
Risk identification is “the process of finding, recognizing and describing risks” (SAHB 89, 
s3.3).  Whilst traditional risk identification may involve data analysis, modelling, testing and 
research, the dynamic and often critical nature of emergency response requires the process of 
risk identification to be undertaken in an instantaneous yet accurate manner.  As Kunadharaju, 
Smith and Dejoy (2011) identify, “there is little protective redundancy in firefighting” and 
emergency situations often change with little or no forewarning. 
 
The dynamic nature of emergency incidents also requires risk identification to be undertaken 
frequently; with each risk identification and subsequent analysis occurring as a single event at 
a point in time as opposed to being an ongoing sustained practice throughout the duration of 
an incident.  It may therefore be argued that the term “dynamic” in dynamic risk assessment 
must only refer to the constantly changing emergency event as opposed to an ongoing yet 
changing structure of risk management.   
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SAHB 89 identifies that the process of risk identification may take the form of structured 
techniques which involve the use of foresight in conjunction with existing knowledge to 
develop a series of ‘what if’ questions.  The ‘what if’ questions within the literature reviewed 
were inherently dependent on the incident controller’s own personal knowledge and experience 
as opposed to quantified data or formal evidence based practice (DFES, 2013c, 2015c).   
 
 
Risk analysis (also known as risk assessment) is the “process to comprehend the nature of risk 
and to determine the level of risk” (SAHB 89, s3.4).  The process of comprehension requires 
the risk manager to be able to adequately interpret risk sources in a structured manner and to 
subsequently understand the probability and consequences of an event occurring.  During even 
the most rapidly changing emergency situations the risk management framework and structure 
remains the same.  Each risk analysis must be considered a new separate analysis, even if it 
builds upon a previously and recently completed analysis of the same emergency situation at 
an earlier point in time.   
 
This realisation is significant because it supports the theory that dynamic risk management 
does not involve a changing architecture or process of analysis, but rather the same risk 
management architecture and analysis process applied multiple times during a rapidly changing 
(dynamic) emergency situation.  The risk analysis undertaken during an emergency may 
therefore comply with AS31000, even if it is required to be supported by extensive pre-incident 
analysis and preparation. 
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Risk analysis may either be qualitative, quantitative or a combination of both.  However, 
quantitative analysis requires the analysis of numerical data to determine probability.  Risk can 
then be described as a numerical value by multiplying the sum of incident exposures, statistical 
probability and consequence weight (Xin & Huang, 2013).  Quantitative Risk analysis of this 
nature requires extensive data and time, therefore it cannot be undertaken within the parameters 
and constraints of a single emergency incident.  This is highlighted in the Australian Capital 
Territory Emergency Services Authority (date unknown) Dynamic Risk assessment overview 
statement that “often, rescues have to be performed, exposures protected and hose lines placed 
before a complete appreciation of all material facts have been obtained” (p2).   
 
Qualitative analysis involves descriptive and often subjective appraisal of risk as described by 
the assessor.  It is often useful when risk treatment strategies involve multiple risks at different 
levels that cannot be accurately measured on the same quantitative scale (SAHB 89).  It is an 
approach that is identified as being employed during preliminary or scoping assessments.  For 
example, SAHB 89 states that “in cases where the analysis is qualitative, there should be a 
clear explanation of all the terms employed and the basis for all criteria should be recorded” 
(p18). Review of fire services literature (ACTEMS, unknown; DFES, 2013a; NZFS, 2018; 
SACFS, 2014) identified that whilst prioritised objectives of the protection of life, property and 
the environment were common across jurisdictions, explanations of terminology were largely 
absent from operational material.  Whilst some explanation of qualitative risk was found 
(DFES, 2013d, 2014) these explanations were found in corporate policies rather than in 
operational doctrine or procedure. 
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Quantitative risk analysis relies on the numerical representation and calculation of event 
probabilities, frequencies and distributions.  Considered the epitome of fire risk analysis in the 
International Fire Engineering Guidelines (ABCB, 2005), probabilistic risk analysis requires 
detailed and time consuming consideration of all possible outcomes as either a function of 
incidence, Bayesean probability or life/dollar loss per unit time (Yung, 2008).  Such analysis 
requires availability of substantial high quality data as well as the ability to numerically 
represent variability within defined confidence levels.  Whilst typical quantitative analysis, 
including fault tree or event tree diagrams, may be particularly useful for pre-incident planning 
and as a supporting assurance process, their complexity and time required for completion 
render them impractical for incident ground completion.  Review of available literature 
identified that whilst significant international statistical analysis of fire related fatality and 
injury data were available (DCLG, 2012; FEMA, 2009, 2011) a total absence of statistical 
analysis of Australian firefighting injuries and risk management during dynamic operations 
was noted in both published and internal brigade documentation.  
 
Analysis of implemented controls may be considered to have both qualitative and quantitative 
components (SAHB 89, SAHB 436).  For example, reviews of historical injury data may 
provide quantitative probabilities pertaining to the effectiveness of certain personal protective 
equipment in reducing firefighter injuries, whilst fire ground experience may provide an 
incident controller with valuable insight into the effectiveness of specific tactics in certain 
situations.  Yung (2008) asserts that reliance on qualitative assessment alone must be 
considered fundamentally flawed because subjective judgements cannot be verified and may 
often differ between operators.  Further, the same operator may make different decisions given 
the same situation at various points in time.  The use of a mixed approach may provide the 
  
 
 
pg. 20 
 
benefits of pre-incident quantitative data analysis supporting the rapid qualitative analysis 
conducted by incident controllers in dynamic emergency situations.  This type of approach can 
be represented by a Bow-Tie analysis (SAHB 436) allowing the predetermined risk sources 
and prioritised event causes to be the focus of qualitative assessment during dynamic 
emergency situations (see figure 5, p72).   
 
Decisions made on the incident ground have previously been found to be reactionary rather 
than considered (Ash & Smallman, 2008; Sadler, Holgate & Clancy, 2007) or to be adapted 
from previous experience at similar situations or incidents potentially without thorough 
analysis (Tissington, 2004).  Jacobs (2010) as well as Loflin and Kipp (1997) suggest dynamic 
risk management in the emergency rescue context is often restricted to a qualitative selection 
of tactics guided by tacit professional craft knowledge as opposed to quantified risk assessment 
and evidence based practice as part of the entire risk management process.    In order to achieve 
consistency with AS31000, it is suggested incident ground decisions must be made using a 
combination of quantified historical statistical analysis and qualitative personal judgement by 
the incident controller. 
 
 
Evaluation of risk may only be correctly undertaken if there are clear criteria (context and risk 
threshold) against which the evaluation occurs.  As previously identified, clear and concise risk 
criterion specific to dynamic emergency situations are not prevalent throughout fire services.  
Consequently, incident ground controllers may be considered to be largely self-reliant on their 
own decision making processes and internal judgement.  
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Klein’s Recognition-Primed Decision (1989) and Rasmussen’s Decision Ladder (1976, cited 
in Naikar, 2010) represent two accepted models representing the decision process of 
experienced personnel in dynamic situations.  Both models are dependent on a high level of 
expertise from the decision maker and the ability to process information in a structured 
sequence that characterises rational, knowledge-based behaviour (Naikar, 2010).  Neither 
model references the application of risk management into the decision making process or how 
prior exposure may influence risk tolerance and the cognitive process.  This suggests that unless 
risk management forms part of the inherent expertise of the practitioner it will not be 
considered.  Further, inappropriate or insufficient understanding and consideration of risk may 
leave emergency services personnel with potentially dangerous familiarity with the hazards 
they face (Sadler, Holgate & Clancy, 2007). 
 
Differences in the identification of objectives and the willingness to accept and retain risk (risk 
tolerance) between strategic and tactical levels within an emergency services organisation, as 
reported by Ash and Smallman (2008) and Jacobs (2010), may result in risk management 
decisions being made by incident controllers that could be later considered to be inappropriate 
or unjustified.  Further, Ash and Smallman (2010) identified the perception by emergency 
services personnel that strategic (organisational) decisions and guidance may hinder 
achievement of goals at a tactical level and actually contribute to inappropriate risk 
management during emergency response. 
 
 
Risk treatment involves the application of mitigating processes, systems or other inhibitors to 
reduce the likelihood or consequence of an event occurring (AS31000, SAHB 89, SAHB 436).  
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Consequences of inaccurate identification of risk and subsequent analysis and treatment can be 
catastrophic with Moore-Merill et al (cited in Ash and Smallman, 2010) identifying 19% of all 
firefighter deaths in the United States between 2000 and 2005 being a direct result of human 
error.  In the context of firefighting operations, risk treatments (also known as controls) may 
be considered in the contextualisation of the traditional hierarchy of controls. 
 
The hierarchy of controls relates to the application of risk barriers or treatments that either 
reduce the likelihood of an event occurring or reduce the severity of a consequence (Robinson 
et al., 2010.  The higher the order of the treatment, the more it is deemed to be effective.  A 
contextualised hierarchy of controls is illustrated in Figure 3.  At the top of the hierarchy is 
“elimination” which refers to the removal of the risk source.  In the firefighting context this 
may be viewed as pre-operational actions such as arson prevention or road safety campaigns.  
During an emergency incident “elimination” may include the decision not to commit crews, 
but rather to isolate a fuel source and permit it to ‘burn out’ so that lives are not endangered.   
 
Figure 3: Contextualised Hierarchy of Controls 
Elimination
Substitution
Engineering
Administration
Personnel Attitudes
PPE
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Next in the hierarchy is “substitution” which is difficult to translate to the firefighting context 
because firefighters often respond to emergency situations where time and resourcing 
restrictions are encountered.  It may be considered that a decision to use defensive firefighting 
strategies, as opposed to offensive internal firefighting strategies, may meet the definition for 
substitution because even though the risk source is not eliminated, the approach to resolving 
the incident is specifically varied in a manner that reduces the potential for an adverse event to 
occur. 
 
“Engineering” controls are those that isolate assets from the risk source.  In the firefighting 
context this may only be partially achieved because there is likely to be a requirement for at 
least several firefighters to be present within the ‘hot’ zone (DFES, 2012b, 2015b, 2015d) and 
this remains essential to resolving many dynamic emergency situations.  Isolation occurs 
through the implementation of controlled access to areas within an emergency incident that are 
the greatest risk source through Entry Control Officers and physical demarcation (DFES, 
2015a, 2015b).  Despite the use of isolation controls at emergency incidents, which may reduce 
the potential for greater numbers of adverse outcomes, incident controllers are still required to 
commit sufficient firefighters into hazardous situations in order to resolve the emergency. 
 
“Administrative” controls are the policies, procedures and ‘doctrine’ that provide 
organisational guidance as to the appropriate manner in which to resolve a dynamic emergency 
situation.  Extensive fire services literature in this area was found (DFES, 2013a, 2013d), 
however, an absence of established risk criterion or documented risk thresholds was also noted.  
No reason for this absence was found. 
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“Personnel attitudes” are an addition to the traditional hierarchy of controls and may be 
considered a critical component to the contextualised hierarchy of controls within the 
firefighting environment.  It may be considered that personnel attitudes are significantly 
influenced by the internal context in which they evolve (Lloyd, 2005, Lloyd, 2008) and the 
internal context of firefighters is particularly influential.  Without specific guidance and 
ongoing detailed training, personnel may be encouraged (or even forced) to behave in a 
particular way “not because they believe in that form of behaviour but it is seen as the way out 
of a predicament” (Hutchinson, 2010, p15).  It is therefore surmised that the attitude of 
individual firefighters under the command of an incident controller must be considered in the 
contextualised hierarchy of controls.  Whilst good attitudes will afford some benefit for the 
reduction of the likelihood of an adverse outcome, poor attitudes will inevitably increase the 
potential for failure to implement or abide by other controls and therefore increase both the 
probability and severity of adverse outcomes on the incident ground. 
 
“Personal protective equipment” colloquially known as PPE within fire services represents the 
final line of defence between personnel and an adverse outcome.  Whilst some PPE may in fact 
reduce the potential for realisation of an adverse effect, for instance breathing apparatus 
theoretically preventing a firefighter inhaling toxic smoke and products of combustion (DFES, 
2015a, 2015b), it must also be considered that the presence of PPE may result in firefighters 
undertaking greater risk taking behaviour due to a perception that the PPE affords them 
complete or excessive levels of protection (Penney, 2013). 
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By definition, dynamic emergency situations constantly change.  Regardless of whether an 
incident involves a leaking hazardous material, multi storey apartment fire or a heavy vehicle 
crash, the number and level of hazards will change as the incident evolves (DFES, 2012a, 
2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2015a).  Monitoring, review and communication may be considered to 
occur on two distinct levels appropriate to the internal and external context. 
 
Within the internal environment of a dynamic emergency incident the incident controller must 
constantly reapply the risk management architecture within the operational constraints they 
face.  This cyclical process is illustrated by Bailey (2007) in Figure 4 and represents the current 
approach adopted by Australian fire services to dynamic risk management as supported in the 
literature reviewed.  As previously discussed, the available time with which to make decisions 
and subsequently communicate these decisions to all persons on the incident ground is likely 
to be limited, whilst the potential consequences of an incorrect decision may be catastrophic.  
The monitoring and review process may also be limited to a single decision maker or the 
Incident Management Team depending on the severity and longevity of an incident (DFES, 
2013a, 2013c, 2015c).  Whilst the Incident Management Team has the luxury of discussion, 
multiple experiences and qualifications to draw from, the sole incident controller is only 
resourced by their own knowledge and experiences.  This realisation supports the notion that 
pre-event risk analysis may be critical to supporting correct decisions during dynamic 
emergency incidents.  
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   Figure 4: Fireground decision making cycle (Bailey, 2007, p4). 
 
External to the immediate dynamic emergency event, post incident reviews, Worksafe 
investigations and even criminal prosecutions may occur.  These external reviews will occur 
weeks if not many months after an incident has finished with findings potentially handed down 
by persons external to the fire service culture.  Therefore, critical assessment of the decisions 
made, particularly if catastrophic outcomes are realised, will not be made against internal fire 
services procedures or doctrine but rather against the standards and duty of care required by 
the greater community. 
 
In considering the impacts of both internal and external reviews of risk management during 
dynamic emergency operations, it is concluded that it is vital for decisions made within the 
internal firefighting context (during an active dynamic emergency environment) to meet the 
standards expected by the external community.  Failure to achieve this may result in additional 
consequences unforeseen during the emergency. 
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2.4 United Kingdom Incident Risk Management  
The risk management methodology for dynamic emergency incidents adopted by United 
Kingdom Fire Services as published by the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) is comprehensive and requires specific attention in this report.  The first 
of these publications is the Fire and Rescue Authorities “Health, safety and welfare framework 
for the operational environment” (DCLG, 2013) which details a comprehensive architecture 
for management of dynamic incident risk that commences with the brigade’s senior officers 
and ends with the individual emergency responder on the incident ground.  This publication is 
unique amongst the literature reviewed in that it not only acknowledges Health and Safety 
legislation, often viewed as encumbrance to emergency response, but embraces it as a pillar of 
dynamic emergency risk management.   
 
In doing so the United Kingdom Fire Services succinctly define both internal and external 
organisational risk contexts as they apply to frontline operations allowing incident controllers.  
Further, DCLG (2013) not only articulates the dynamic incident risk assessment process 
through the hierarchy of command but provides multiple fire service specific examples for 
incident controllers and front line personnel of all ranks and operational roles to reference.  
Perhaps most importantly from an organisational context is the recognition that “standard 
operational procedures need to be sufficiently flexible to allow the Incident Commander to 
exercise discretion on the resources and the procedures required to resolve the emergency” 
(DCLG, 2013, p23).  The flexibility for incident controllers and personnel to use ‘operational 
discretion’ is carefully articulated and “should be based on a balance in terms of risk versus 
benefit, and the Incident Commander knowing the action which they are normally required by 
the relevant standard operational procedure” (DCLG, 2013, p23).   
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The second publication is the Fire and Rescue Manual 2nd Volume “Fire Service Operations – 
Incident Command” (DCLG, 2008).  It is the doctrine of fire service dynamic incident 
management at all levels and embraces incident risk management as one of the three key 
elements required for effective incident command.  Most significantly DCLG (2008, p64) 
recognises “in order to provide an acceptable level of protection at operational incidents, the 
organisations health and safety management must operate at three different levels – Strategic, 
Systematic and Dynamic.”  At a strategic level, risk management defines the fire service’s risk 
attitudes and establishes internal context whilst complying with relevant external contexts.  
This is achieved through appropriate policy and doctrine that embrace the risk philosophy of 
the fire service.  Systematic risk management is completed by the operational subject matter 
experts in each discipline.  The results subsequently guide the development and implementation 
of operations including but not limited to safe work systems, procedures, equipment, training 
and supervision.  Dynamic risk management occurs during an operational incident and 
encompasses all risk management carried out by all personnel involved in the incident whilst 
an emergency situation is present.   
 
In considering the application of ‘dynamic risk management’ it is essential to distinguish 
between time critical emergency situations, for instance where lives are endangered and rescue 
is required, and non-emergency situations such as body recovery.  The distinction is critical as 
risk thresholds will vary accordingly as demonstrated in the New Zealand “Safe Person 
Concept” (NZFS, 2008) and the philosophy of the DCLG (2008, p65) 
“In a highly calculated way, firefighters: 
 Will take some risk to save saveable lives. 
 May take some risk to save saveable property. 
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 Will not take any risk at all to try and save lives or property that are already 
lost.” 
 
Whilst New Zealand literature considers dynamic incident risk management in isolation, the 
United Kingdom acknowledges it as only a part of the greater risk management process 
applicable to the fire service as a workplace and subsequently ensures transference of the 
internal and external risk contexts into the dynamic incident risk management process. This 
holistic approach adopted by DCLG (2008, 2013) enables Incident Controllers to manage risk 
in accordance with AS31000 regardless of the nature of the emergency encountered. 
 
2.5 Discussion 
Fire services have a strong culture and tradition that culminates in a unique internal risk 
management environment.  Firefighters have been found to hold common attitudes towards 
personal risk tolerance and an occupation that places them directly in stressful emergency 
situations that may promote risk taking behaviour.  This is compounded by a perception of 
community expectation that firefighters will put their own lives in peril for others in life or 
death situations.  Therefore, the requirement for accurate and timely risk assessment and 
management in dynamic situations becomes critical. 
 
Australian and international fire service literature extensively details the strategic and tactical 
approaches for a significant variety of dynamic emergency incidents.  Significant studies 
examining the decision making process of incident ground incident controllers were also found.  
With the exception of DCLG (2008, 2013) the reviewed literature provides somewhat more 
limited guidance as to the management of risk in dynamic emergency situations. Even more 
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limited is an analysis of the specific compliance of this guidance with the standards of the 
external environment and potential external review. 
 
The absence of formal guidance from Australian fire services towards AS31000 compliant risk 
management is not perceived as a deliberate measure, but rather as the result of an evolution 
of risk management in business driving standards and litigation at a faster rate than within the 
unique and largely traditional firefighting environment.   It is not suggested that quantitative 
risk analysis can be undertaken within the dynamic emergency context.  However, completion 
of quantitative risk analysis prior to an event and its use to support risk management practices 
during dynamic emergency incidents is however, viewed as being critical for the alignment of 
internal and external expectations and risk management standards.   
 
The philosophies and processes articulated in DCLG (2008, 2013) are the gold standard of 
dynamic incident risk management.  Results of the data obtained and discussed in the next 
section of this thesis are designed to enable the contextualisation of these documents within the 
Department of Fire and Emergency Services and to facilitate bridging the risk management 
knowledge gap identified in Australia. 
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3.0 Study Methodology 
3.1 Overview 
The study utilised both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies.  Data was collected 
in two distinct phases.  The first involved qualitative observational ethnology, the second 
involved collection of historical incident and safety reports.  Ethics approval was obtained 
through the Human Ethics Committee, Edith Cowan University whilst formal approval of the 
research was also provided by the Commissioner of Fire and Emergency Services.   
 
The primary objective of this study was to determine whether current risk management 
practices in dynamic emergency incidents are compliant with AS31000.  A subsequent 
objective was to define the internal context of dynamic risk management within the operational 
incident management and response section of the Department of Fire and Emergency Service 
(DFES).  The internal context was defined by either the formal documentation of the 
organisation (SAHB 436), or in the absence of such documentation, the collective beliefs that 
serve to form the operating consensus.  As the literature review identified an absence of formal 
documentation or guidance that established the internal context, the first phase of this study 
utilised ethnographic qualitative research to document the beliefs and dynamic risk 
management culture of incident controllers within DFES.   
 
The absence of research in the field of rescue science equates to a lack of priors and little 
guidance regarding study design.  The dynamic and irregular nature of emergency operations 
(DFES, 2012a, 2013a, 2015a, 2015b) resulted in field observation being considered 
inappropriate by the study team.  Further, it was deemed critical to ensure the design of the 
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study was not only appropriate to answer the research question posed; but would also yield 
sufficient data to ensure the validity of results.   These limitations are addressed through careful 
study design.   
 
The use of a semi-structured interview and subsequent in-depth structured survey enabled 
exploration and documentation of the beliefs, understanding and attitudes of a specific 
population of incident controllers within DFES which ultimately form the internal context of 
the risk management process (Silverman, 2011; Taylor, 2005).   Using this approach, 
information rich data was collected from the target population.   
 
The limited availability of quantitative data was addressed through the use of Bayesian 
theorem.  In contrast to the traditional frequentist approach, Bayesian statistics provide robust 
analysis with small data sets (Cutcliffe, Schmidt, Lucas & Bass, 2012; Salkind, 2010).  
Posterior probability is established through repeated use of Bayesian theorem on empirical data 
collected during the experiment itself (Wong, Warren & Kawchuk, 2010).  In this manner 
Bayesian analysis is better suited to guide decisions within the context of practical dynamic 
emergency operations (Ferson, unknown; Goldstein, 2006). 
 
3.2 Phase One 
 
Phase one involved ethnographic qualitative interactive observation of 20 serving officers of 
the Department of Fire and Emergency Services (DFES) between September 2014 and 
November 2014.  Semi-structured interviews and subsequent in-depth structured surveys were 
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conducted focusing on the participant’s risk attitudes and beliefs.  The participation of one 
candidate was interrupted by an incident call out, resulting in 19 interviews and surveys being 
available for analysis.   
 
O’Brien (2002) identifies that the number of participants should be guided by the richness of 
the data.  Given the relatively limited population of incident controllers within the DFES Fire 
& Rescue Service of 274 officers (DFES Human Services, 2016) and the richness of the data 
collected, the 19 participants representing 7% of the overall population was considered 
sufficient for the study. 
 
 
Data from interviews was analysed using customised Excel spreadsheets created by the lead 
researcher to establish similar trends related to the understanding of risk and risk management 
in dynamic situations in order to establish organisational context.  Results assisted to establish 
the internal context of emergency services in relation to dynamic risk management.  Bayesian 
analysis was used to quantify risk acceptance thresholds which further established risk 
thresholds of the participants.   
 
In this manner, the overall probability of specific outcomes can be determined using the 
formula: 
𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴) × 𝑃(𝐵) 
 
Where 
𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) is the probability that both A and B occur; 
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𝑃(𝐴) is the probability that A will occur; and 
𝑃(𝐵) is the probability that B will occur. 
 
The conditional probability (P) of a specific injury being sustained (A) given an injury is 
sustained during a certain task at an incident (B) can be determined using the formula: 
𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) =
𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵)
𝑃(𝐵)
 
Where 
𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) is the probability that A will occur given the fact that B has already occurred; 
𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) is the probability that both A and B occur; and 
𝑃(𝐵) is the probability that B will occur. 
In order to determine risk tolerance where certainty is not achieved a certainty factor (Blamey, 
2008; Lucas, 2008; Roventa & Spircu, 2009) was applied.  Using an approach derived from 
Roventa and Spircu (2009) in consideration of the responses of the entire study population to 
the semi-structure interview the following certainty factor was developed for the analysis: 
𝐼𝑓 𝑃(𝐴) ≥ 1.5 × 𝑃(𝐵) 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑃(𝐴) 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 
𝐼𝑓 𝑃(𝐵) ≥ 1.5 × 𝑃(𝐴) 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑃(𝐵) 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 
𝐼𝑓 𝑃(𝐴) < 1.5 × 𝑃(𝐵) 𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑓 𝑃(𝐵) < 1.5 × 𝑃(𝐴)𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 
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3.3 Phase Two 
 
The objective of phase two of this study was to interrogate existing data sets to establish 
conditional probabilities that would enhance the understanding of the internal and external 
context of dynamic risk management within the operational incident management and response 
section of DFES.  Thus a retrospective analysis of safety and incident reports from the DFES 
Health and Safety data base between January 1st 2001 and January 1st 2015 was conducted.  All 
reports related to incidents responded to by the frontline operational arm of DFES.  All 
information that could identify personnel was redacted by DFES prior to collection by the 
investigator.  1,997 individual reports were initially analysed.  To ensure data reflected injuries 
sustained during operational events, the following inclusion criterion were applied: 
1. Event must relate to a specific operational incident; and 
2. An injury must have occurred or the potential for injury must be identified. 
 
For the purposes of this study injury was defined as any adverse outcome that was physical or 
psychological in nature, whilst the term operational incident was defined as an incident 
responded to by DFES personnel that was assigned an internal incident identification number.  
Following application of the inclusion criteria 666 reports were identified as suitable for 
analysis.  
 
 
Data was initially categorised according to: 
1. Activity (being the primary task undertaken at the time of the reported incident); 
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2. Initiating event (being the risk source);  
3. Nature of the injury reported; 
4. Actual severity of the consequence reported; and 
5. Potential severity of the consequence reported. 
 
Based on the report descriptions and the findings of the literature review, 12 categories of 
activity were determined: 
1. Breathing Apparatus – where the use of self-contained breathing apparatus was reported 
as the primary activity being undertaken; 
2. Bushfire Fighting – including grass, scrub and forest firefighting efforts; 
3. DBA – Direct Brigade Alarm response to monitored premises fire alarms; 
4. Driving – driving of appliances either to or during an emergency incident; 
5. Environmental – animal related reports including rescues, bites and stings; 
6. Firefighting – all structural and property fire including vehicles but not including 
reported hazardous materials; 
7. Hazmat – Hazardous Materials response; 
8. Not Reported – reports that did not identify the activity undertaken at the time of event; 
9. RCR – Road Crash Rescue response to vehicle extrication of all types; 
10. Rescue – Rescue of all types not involving vehicle extrication; 
11. Storm – storm response; and 
12. Suicide Response – response to suicide. 
Based on the report descriptions 22 initiating events or risk sources were determined: 
1. Animal – all animals other than humans; 
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2. Blast/Explosion – an explosion from any source; 
3. Communications – communications procedures related to the incident; 
4. Electrical – electrocution, electric shock or other electricity related incident; 
5. Entrapment – entrapment of person not attributed to other cause; 
6. Environmental – natural events or sources not related to animals; 
7. Equipment failure – failure of a specified piece of equipment; 
8. Exposure (asbestos) – exposure to asbestos particles; 
9. Exposure (biohazard) – exposure to body fluids; 
10. Exposure (chemical) – exposure to a chemical not otherwise classified; 
11. Exposure (hazmat fire) – exposure to chemicals that are actively involved in fire; 
12. Exposure (noise) – exposure to loud noise; 
13. Exposure (psychological) – exposure to events reported to (or have the potential to)  
cause negative psychological impacts; 
14. Exposure (smoke) – exposure to smoke and other unburned products of combustion 
not including hazmat fire; 
15. Impact – physical impact of one object on another, typically involving the person 
reporting; 
16. Impaired vision – visual impairment;  
17. Not reported – no risk source reported; 
18. Operator error – an unintentional or intentional action by a person that resulted in the 
injury; 
19. Other person – injury or event initiated by another person not relating to violence; 
20. Physical strain – muscular or joint strain from operational response efforts; 
21. Thermal – extreme heat or cold; 
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22. Violence – physical assault by another person. 
Based on the report descriptions 30 categories of injuries were determined: 
1. Abdominal – injuries to the abdominal region; 
2. Absorption – absorption through the skin or mucous membranes; 
3. Ankle – injuries to the ankle; 
4. Arm – injuries to the arm not otherwise classified; 
5. Back – injuries to the back that were not skeletal in nature, not including neck injuries; 
6. Chest – injuries to the chest region; 
7. Ear – injuries to one or both ears; 
8. Elbow – injuries to the elbow; 
9. Eye – injuries to one or both eyes; 
10. Face – facial injuries not including the head, neck, eyes or ears; 
11. Finger – injuries to one or multiple fingers; 
12. Foot – injuries to one or both feet; 
13. General – exposures to a substance not otherwise defined in the reports; 
14. Groin – injuries to the groin region; 
15. Hand – injuries to one or both hands; 
16. Head/Spinal – injuries to the head or spine that do or have the potential to cause 
structural skeletal damage; 
17. Heat illness – all forms of heat illness; 
18. Hip – injuries to one or both hips; 
19. Ingestion – swallowing of a substance; 
20. Inhalation – inhalation of a substance; 
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21. Knee – injuries to one or both knees; 
22. Leg – injuries to one or both legs not otherwise classified; 
23. Multiple – multiple areas of injury; 
24. Neck – neck injury not related to structural damage of the spine; 
25. Nil – no injury suffered; 
26. Not reported – no injury or exposure reported; 
27. Psychological – exposure to events reported to (or have the potential to) cause negative 
psychological impacts; 
28. Shoulder – injuries to one or both shoulders; 
29. Thermal – burns as a result from heat or cold; and 
30. Wrist – injuries to one or both wrists. 
The severity of the consequence was extrapolated from the report description and classified 
according to the DFES Risk Matrix (DFES, 2015g): 
1. Insignificant – no treatment required; no lost time; 
2. Minor – first aid treatment only; no lost time; 
3. Moderate – medical treatment; lost time – less than 10 days lost; 
4. Major – hospitalisation/significant injury; lost time – more than 10 days lost; and 
5. Catastrophic – severe permanent injury / disability / fatality(ies). 
The potential severity of the consequence was determined by selecting the highest consequence 
from both the reports collected and review of comparative incident reports from FEMA (2012).  
The same categories of consequence were applied as above. 
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The activity at the time of injury and nature of the injury sustained was extrapolated from the 
incident reports to facilitate probability modelling; determination of severity of the actual and 
potential consequence; and calculation of incident likelihood.  Likelihood was determined 
using the formula: 
𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 =  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 (15 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠)
 
Likelihood was defined in accordance with the DFES Risk Matrix (DFES, 2015g): 
1. Rare – may only occur in exceptional circumstances (once in 10 years); 
2. Unlikely – could occur at some time (once in 5 years); 
3. Moderate – should occur sometime (once in 2 years); 
4. Likely – will probably occur in most circumstances (at least once per year); and 
5. Very likely – expected to occur in most circumstances (more than once per year). 
 
Data relating to the type of activity undertaken at the time of injury and the nature of the injury 
sustained was analysed using Bayesian statistics to determine the overall and conditional 
probability of specific injuries being sustained during the various tasks undertaken during an 
emergency incident.   
 
The analysis was repeated for each activity, risk source and injury to determine the conditional 
probability of: 
1. A specific injury being sustained (A) given an injury is sustained during a certain task 
at an incident (B); 
2. A certain consequence severity occurring based on historical data (A) given an injury 
is sustained during a certain task at an incident (B); and 
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3. A certain potential consequence was possible (A) given an injury sustained during a 
certain task at an incident.  
 
 
One limitation of the study was potential reluctance of participants to provide answers, beliefs 
or attitudes that they felt may not be viewed favourably by superior officers.  Reluctance to 
participate within this study on the grounds was addressed through a reassurance of the 
anonymity of all data collected.  Despite this reassurance, some potential participants elected 
not to participate.  This may have resulted in some bias when defining the internal context of 
the organisation. 
 
During the initial stages of development of the study proposal a concern was raised that due to 
the relatively small size of the operational service of DFES; factors such as age, rank and 
gender could be used to identify participants.  Therefore, participants age, rank and gender 
were not recorded to ensure the anonymity which subsequently limited the potential for data 
analysis on these characteristics.   
 
Another limitation was the limited injury priors available for analysis.  The accuracy of 
documentation, potential reluctance of frontline staff to report incidents and limited 
information documented in recorded incidents may lead to bias in calculated probabilities.  A 
benefit of the use of Bayesian analysis was that future studies can build upon these initial 
findings to enhance the accuracy of calculated probabilities as more data become available. 
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Only a single emergency service within Western Australia was examined in this study.  The 
internal contexts between different emergency services within the same state and the same 
emergency service in different states will inevitably vary to some degree.  The results of this 
study are directly applicable to dynamic risk management in emergency incidents within the 
DFES in Western Australia, but do not necessarily represent the internal contexts of other 
emergency services.   
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4.0 Results and Discussion 
This chapter discusses the profile of participants in phase 1 of the study. Results and analysis 
of the respondents’ interview questions and structured survey are reported upon.  The results 
and analysis of the 666 incident reports included in phase 2 of the study are also detailed in this 
chapter.   
 
4.1 Phase One 
 
The objective of this study was to define the internal and external context of dynamic risk 
management within the operational incident management and response section of the 
Department of Fire and Emergency Service (DFES).  The semi-structured interview was 
specifically designed to extrapolate and document the participant’s understanding and attitudes 
towards ‘traditional’ and dynamic risk management. 
 
Subsequently four questions were asked during the interview: 
1. How do you define risk? 
2. How do you manage risk in a dynamic emergency environment compared to other 
situations and contexts? 
3. How do you decide whether risks are acceptable in a dynamic emergency environment? 
4. Does the risk management process differ in the dynamic emergency environment 
compared to other situations?  If yes, then how? 
 
 
The profile of participants was collected from questions within the structured survey.  The 19 
participants were all operational incident controllers at various ranks within DFES.  Both 
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metropolitan and regional staff were included in the study. Table 1 shows the number of years’ 
experience of the participants: 
 
 Experience Number Percent 
Nil 0 0% 
0-5 0 0% 
6-10 1 5% 
11-15 5 26% 
16-20 2 11% 
21-25 3 16% 
25+ 7 37% 
Other 1 5% 
Table 1:  Comparison of years’ experience of participants 
As shown in Table 1, no respondents had less than six years’ experience.  This was not 
unexpected due to entry level officers requiring a minimum Senior Firefighter qualification 
prior to application which takes five years to obtain.  By a fractional margin the majority of 
participants held in excess of 20 years’ experience (53%).  Without further research there 
appears to be no specific reason for this.  The participant whom selected “other” did not provide 
further elaboration. 
 
The second comparison focused upon the basis of the highest level of training or education the 
participant had received in AS31000. 
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Answer Number Percent 
None 3 17% 
Short Course 1 6% 
In House 12 67% 
Undergraduate 0 0% 
Postgraduate 1 6% 
Other 1 6% 
Table 2:  Comparison of training in AS31000 
 
The results overwhelmingly illustrate the majority of participants believed they had received 
“In House” training in the AS31000 risk management process.  The participant who marked 
“Other” provided clarification that risk management had been discussed as a component of 
other courses but had not been specifically addressed in its own right.  One participant did not 
provide an answer to the question.  These results support the findings of Penney (2013) 
whereby professional craft knowledge was considered to be passed down through generations 
of firefighters as opposed to being formally studied through external providers.  The results 
also appear to support the initial conclusions of the literature review that emergency services 
may have developed risk management attitudes and beliefs that are internally valid (Ash & 
Smallman, 2010; Fender, 2003; Jacobs, 2010; Lofflin & Kipp, 1997), but are not necessarily 
compliant with AS31000 which requires internal context to be explicitly defined.  Such 
attitudes may prevail in an apparently successful manner whilst they remain unchallenged, 
however should they be examined in detail by an external party it is foreseeable that the 
practices would face at least some level of criticism. The level of criticism would likely be 
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significant should the internal risk attitudes be found to both be inconsistent with AS31000 and 
contribute towards the injury or death of emergency services personnel. 
 
The third comparison focused upon the basis of the highest level of training or education the 
participant had received in Dynamic Risk Management.   
Answer Number Percent 
None 4 21% 
Short Course 2 11% 
In House 12 63% 
Undergraduate 0 0% 
Postgraduate 0 0% 
Other 1 5% 
Table 3:  Comparison of training in Dynamic Risk Management 
 
The participant who marked “Other” provided clarification they had received “In House” 
training in Dynamic Risk Management.  These findings are consistent with those in Table 2 
and appear consistent with the literature which did not report any tertiary risk management 
training (Ash & Smallman, 2010; Fender, 2003; Lofflin & Kipp, 1997) undertaken by 
personnel in other fire services. 
 
Participants were also questioned as to whether they had been injured at an emergency incident 
being controlled by another person.  These results are shown in Table 4. 
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Answer Number Percent 
Yes 9 47% 
No 10 53% 
Table 4:  Comparison of participants injured at an incident controlled by other person. 
 
These results indicate an almost even distribution of those participants who had and had not 
been injured at incidents controlled by other parties.  As a result of these findings the structured 
survey was subject to additional analysis to determine whether being injured under another 
person’s command resulted in certain bias.  This additional analysis is discussed in Chapter 5.  
The fifth comparison focused upon the basis of whether participants had been responsible for 
managing risk at an emergency incident where another responder had been severely injured. 
 
Answer Number Percent 
Yes 0 0% 
No 19 100% 
Table 5:  Comparison of participants had been responsible for managing risk at an incident 
where another person was severely injured. 
 
As reported in Table 5, all participants identified they had never been responsible for managing 
risk at an incident where another person was severely injured.  Further investigation, beyond 
the scope of this study would be required to determine whether answers to this question were 
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accurate or skewed as a result of participants not wanting to admit to a person being injured at 
an incident they were responsible for managing due to fears of potential professional 
ramifications. 
The final comparison focused upon the participants’ perception regarding their own level of 
expertise in risk management specific to emergency services response.  These results are 
detailed in Table 6. 
Answer Number Percent 
Cannot effectively manage risk 0 0% 
Can effectively manage risk in limited emergency services 
contexts 
1 5% 
Can effectively manage risk in most emergency services 
contexts 
14 74% 
Can effectively manage risk in every emergency services 
context 
4 21% 
Excel at managing risk in all emergency services contexts 0 0% 
Other 0 0% 
Table 6:  Comparison of participants’ perception of risk management expertise. 
 
These results demonstrate an overwhelming majority of participants perceive they could 
personally effectively manage risk in most emergency services contexts.  This was not 
unexpected as DFES is identified as an “all hazards agency” (DFES, 2013c, 2015c, 2015f).  
The results also suggest that participants collectively believe they can effectively manage risk 
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in various emergency service contexts regardless of the level of training they have received in 
AS31000.  In stark contradiction to SAHB 436:2013 these results suggest an internal attitude 
that AS31000 is not necessarily required for effective risk management in dynamic emergency 
contexts.  This conclusion is consistent with the reported beliefs of personnel in international 
fire services (Ash and Smallman, 2010; Jacobs, 2010) suggesting that for risk management to 
be compliant with AS31000 it must be ingrained as part of the core culture of the fire service. 
 
 
The first question asked of participants in the semi-structured interview was “How do you 
define risk?”  AS31000 (s2.1) defines the term “Risk” as the “effect of uncertainty on 
objectives.”   Further notes are provided in AS31000 (s2.1) as: 
1. An effect is a deviation from the expected – positive and/or negative; 
2. Objectives can have different aspects (such as financial, health and safety, and 
environmental goals) and can apply at different levels (such as strategic, organisation 
wide, project, product and process); 
3. Risk is often characterised by reference to potential events and consequences or a 
combination of these; 
4. Risk is often expressed in terms of a combination of the consequences of an event 
(including changes in circumstances) and the associated likelihood of occurrence; and 
5. Uncertainty is the state, even partial, of deficiency of information related to 
understanding or knowledge of an event, its consequence, or likelihood. 
Whilst all participants responses included at least part of the associated factors identified in the 
notes of AS31000 (s2.1) that risk is a consideration of consequences and likelihood, only one 
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participant (5%) provided the answer “it is the effect of uncertainty on objectives.”    Five 
participants (26%) provided answers that were specific to emergency response without 
consideration of the greater application of risk and one participant provided the restrictive 
definition “risk is the potential to injure me.”    Consistent with the findings of Tissington 
(2004) these answers suggest participants generally have a perception of risk as the practical 
consideration of consequence and likelihood as it applies to a reactive emergency environment 
as opposed to a considered and managed process.  This understanding of risk is not absolutely 
unique to the study group, with similar definitions reported by Reinhardt-Klein (2010) but is 
different to that of at least one other emergency service in Australia (ACTESA, unknown).  
This suggests the study group have adopted a definition of risk that is reasonably consistent 
throughout their population and contextualised to their perception of reality but does not 
consider all elements detailed in AS31000. 
 
The second question asked of participants was “How do you manage risk in a dynamic 
emergency environment compared to other situations and contexts?”  In response, nearly all 
participants identified that risk management in dynamic contexts was based on a similar 
process to risk management in other situations but with limited information available and with 
restricted time frames in which to make decisions.  Two participants (10%) expressed the 
opinion that dynamic risk management required more “forward thinking” than risk 
management in other situations. These responses again suggest the study group have adopted 
a definition of risk that is reasonably consistent throughout their population and contextualised 
to their perception of reality but does not consider all elements detailed in AS31000, especially 
when consideration is given to the example of the special forces soldier in a hostage situation 
detailed in SAHB436 (p45). 
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Eleven participants (58%) also expressed that they managed risk in dynamic emergency 
environments according to how they believed their organisation expected them to do so or that 
they managed risk in accordance with organisational procedures and protocols.  This suggests 
the majority of participants believed they managed risk using the same risk attitudes as their 
organisation, a notion that is analysed further in chapter 5 with consideration that the literature 
review found an absence of documented organisational risk thresholds and attitudes. 
 
Responses from the study group to the third question “How do you decide whether risks are 
acceptable in a dynamic emergency environment?” were varied.  Five participants (26%) 
reported they relied on organisational procedures and protocols; nine participants (47%) 
reported they relied on personal prior experience to determine whether risks were acceptable; 
three (16%) participants stated they simply relied on whether they believed the risk was 
acceptable to themselves personally; and two (10%) participants responded that in the case of 
“life involvement” (being the fire services terminology for when potential consequences 
include the loss of occupant life)  then all risks are acceptable.   
 
Variation in answers provided represents significant variance in the risk thresholds between 
incident controllers within the same organisation.   Conflicts between risk attitudes will 
foreseeably lead to increased risk at an emergency incident as additional uncertainty is 
introduced when individuals work together to form Incident Management Teams or are 
responsible for different sectors within the same emergency incident.  When considered in 
conjunction with the answers provided to question two, the variance in risk thresholds between 
participants suggests an absence of a defined organisational internal risk context that may 
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otherwise guide participants towards similar answers.  This notion is consistent with the 
literature (ACTESA, date unknown; Fender, 2003) and reinforces the conclusion that for risk 
management to be compliant with AS31000 it must be ingrained as part of the core culture of 
the fire service inclusive of explicitly defined risk tolerances.  These findings are explored more 
in the discussion of the results of the structured survey. 
 
The final question posed to participants was “Does the risk management process differ in the 
dynamic emergency environment compared to other situations?  If yes, then how?”  Responses 
provided by participants were far less varied in this instance.  Eight participants (42%) stated 
there was no difference in the process, however four of those eight participants also stated the 
time frame available for completing the risk assessment was significantly reduced during 
dynamic emergency environments.  Interestingly, of those eight participants one also stated 
that risk tolerance is significantly higher during dynamic emergency operations compared to 
other situations which suggests fluctuating risk thresholds depending on the participant’s 
evolving perception of the severity of an incident.  Only one participant (5%) identified that 
the risk management process had to be repeated multiple times throughout the emergency 
incident, suggesting the remaining participants did not consider repeated risk application of the 
risk management process necessary.  This is in contradiction to SAHB 436:2013. 
 
Ten participants (53%) stated that the risk management process did differ in the dynamic 
emergency environment compared to other situations.  Those participants all identified that the 
process changed due to the significant reduction in both available information on which to 
make decisions and available time to gather further information.  One of the ten participants 
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clarified they felt “pushed to do things you wouldn’t normally do due to expectations and 
pressure” indicating they operated at risk thresholds they personally felt were unacceptable.   
 
Of all 19 participants only one (5%)  stated the dynamic risk management process was reactive 
as opposed to being a thought out process.  These findings appear to contradict the previous 
findings of Ash and Smallman (2010), Fender (2003) and Naikar (2010) all of whom identified 
decision making during dynamic emergency incidents is reactive and based on recognition of 
specific cues.   Whilst this finding must be interpreted with some caution due to the relatively 
small sample size of this study, it is supported by the answers provided by the study group to 
the second question posed in the interview.  Subsequently, this suggests that risk management 
in dynamic emergency situations within the study population may be more aligned to AS31000 
than other selected fire services.  
 
One participant (5%) stated they were unsure whether the risk management process differed in 
the dynamic emergency environment compared to other situations.   
 
 
The first question in the structured survey required participants to identify the severity of 
various potential consequences.  From the answers provided, probability analysis was 
completed across the entire sample population.  Conditional probability was then calculated on 
the basis that participants had or had not been previously injured at an incident (from the results 
reported in Table 4).  These results were compared to the severity assigned to the consequence 
in the DFES Risk Matrix (2015g) shown in Table 7.  In this table the highest probability for 
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the entire study population (represented in the “All” column) is highlighted in blue; the highest 
conditional probability of the previously injured group (represented in the “Injured” column) 
is highlighted in orange; the highest conditional probability of the group never having been 
injured (represented in the “Never” column) is highlighted in green; and the severity assigned 
in accordance with the DFES Risk Matrix (DFES, 2015g) outlined in red.    
 
Analysis of the results revealed there is a conditional probability of 0.00 (zero) for all 
participants assigning the same severity to a consequence given the event being realised.  Only 
in a single instance a subgroup completely agreed on the severity of a consequence, being the 
non-injured group agreeing that the death of a rescuer was of catastrophic severity (represented 
by a conditional probability of 1.00).   
 
Further analysis of Table 7 revealed there was an equal probability between the group that had 
never been injured, a conditional probability of 0.2 that the survey groups’ majority severity 
perception would align with the severity assigned using the DFES Risk Matrix (2015g).  Whilst 
some variance was expected by the lead researcher due to potential differences in individuals’ 
perception of the consequence realised, the conditional probability of 0.2 signifies agreement 
between participants and DFES in the perception of consequence severity of only a single 
occurrence each year (refer to the analysis of consequence likelihood on page 41 for calculation 
details).  It is therefore concluded that internal context of risk attitudes is not harmonious 
amongst the study group and may lead to conflicting risk management during dynamic 
emergency situations or post incident analysis.  
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Descriptive analysis of the results illustrated in Table 7 provide a mean probability of 0.612 
(standard deviation of 0.142) that the entire survey group will agree on the severity of any given 
consequence.  This further supports the findings of the potential for conflicting risk attitudes 
between incident controllers and parties conducting post incident analysis. 
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Consequence All 
In
ju
re
d
 
N
ev
er
 
A
ll 
In
ju
re
d
 
N
ev
er
 
A
ll 
In
ju
re
d
 
N
ev
er
 
A
ll 
In
ju
re
d
 
N
ev
er
 
A
ll 
In
ju
re
d
 
N
ev
er
 
Near miss - 
cut finger 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.53 0.44 0.60 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Near miss - 
broken arm 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.58 0.56 0.60 0.16 0.22 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Near miss - 
death of 
rescuer 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.47 0.56 0.40 
Near miss - 
exposure to 
acutely toxic 
material 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.63 0.78 0.50 0.21 0.22 0.20 
Near miss - 
exposure to 
hazardous 
material with 
health effects 
that may take 
20 years to 
occur 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.26 0.00 0.50 0.47 0.78 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.20 
Scratch or 
dent to a 
vehicle 0.26 0.22 0.30 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cut finger 
requiring first 
aid treatment 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.83 0.88 0.80 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Broken arm 
requiring 
hospitalisation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.21 0.33 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Death of a 
rescuer 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.95 0.89 1.00 
Exposure to 
acutely toxic 
hazardous 
material 
requiring 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.56 0.70 0.37 0.44 0.30 
  
 
 
pg. 56 
 
hospital 
admission 
Exposure to 
hazardous 
material that 
results in lung 
damage only 
evident 20 
years post 
exposure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.47 0.56 0.40 
Inhaling 
asbestos 
particulates 
and dust as a 
result of 
rescue 
activities 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.61 0.67 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.40 
Exposure to 
silica 
particulates 
and dust as a 
result of 
rescue 
activities 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.11 0.40 0.63 0.78 0.60 0.11 0.11 0.00 
Exposure to 
glass 
particulates 
and dusts as a 
result of 
rescue 
activities 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.22 0.72 0.78 0.67 0.06 0.11 0.00 
Damage to a 
vehicle 
resulting in 
$1000 damage 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.79 0.89 0.70 0.16 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Damage to a 
vehicle 
resulting in 
$20,000 
damage 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.42 0.56 0.30 0.16 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Damage to the 
environment 
that does not 
result in long 
term impact 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.68 0.44 0.90 0.26 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Damage to the 
environment 
resulting in 
long term 
impact 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.42 0.33 0.50 0.37 0.44 0.30 0.16 0.22 0.10 
Lung tissue 
damage 
without 
respiratory 
impairment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.22 0.50 0.58 0.78 0.40 0.05 0.00 0.10 
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Lung tissue 
damage that 
limits physical 
activity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.44 0.60 0.47 0.56 0.40 
Table 7:  Perceptions of consequence severity. 
An individual’s beliefs and expectations can significantly affect the internal context of the risk 
management process (SAHB 436:2013).  To investigate how this may be a factor in risk 
management during dynamic emergency operations, the second question of the survey required 
participants to identify their beliefs regarding external and personal risk attitudes and 
expectations using a Likert scale.    These results are detailed in Table 8 as a percentage of the 
study population.  In this table the highest percentage for the entire study population 
(represented in the “All” column) is highlighted in blue; the highest percentage of the 
previously injured group (represented in the “Injured” column) is highlighted in orange; and 
the highest percentage of the group never having been injured (represented in the “Never” 
column) is highlighted ingreen. 
 
Belief Strongly 
Disagree (%) 
Disagree (%) Neutral (%) Agree (%) Strongly Agree 
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There is an 
expectation 
that 
emergency 
services 
personnel will 
risk their own 
lives to save 
others 
11 11 10 11 0 20 5 11 0 53 44 60 21 33 10 
There is an 
expectation 
that 
emergency 
16 11 20 11 0 20 21 11 30 47 67 30 5 11 0 
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services 
personnel will 
risk their own 
lives to save 
property 
There is an 
expectation 
that 
emergency 
services 
personnel will 
risk their own 
lives to save 
the 
environment 
21 11 30 16 11 20 37 56 20 26 22 30 0 0 0 
Emergency 
services 
personnel 
have a moral 
obligation to 
put 
themselves at 
a higher level 
of risk than 
the general 
public in the 
course of their 
duties 
5 0 10 16 11 20 5 11 0 68 67 70 5 11 0 
 
Table 8:  Participant beliefs. 
Analysis of these results reveals that the overwhelming majority of the entire study group 
(74%), as well as the both subgroups (Injured 77% and Never Injured 70%), believed there 
were external expectations that emergency services personnel would risk their own lives to 
save others.  By comparison only 52% of the entire study group (Injured 78% and Never Injured 
30%) believed there were external expectations that emergency services personnel would risk 
their own lives to save property.  This difference in attitudes between the Injured and Never 
Injured populations appears to suggest personnel who had a higher personal risk threshold may 
be more likely to be injured during emergency operations, however further research is required 
to confirm this hypothesis. 
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Analysis of the responses to the statement “There is an expectation that emergency services 
personnel will risk their own lives to save the environment” was less conclusive but appeared 
to suggest less belief amongst the study group that this was the case (37% of the total study 
group stating they either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement). 
 
In order to further define the risk attitudes and tolerance of the study group, participants were 
required to identify whether potential scenarios were either acceptable or unacceptable.    
Participants were first required to answer the question in the context that they were personally 
exposed to the risk source, the subsequent context was that the participant was responsible for 
other responders and it was these responders who were exposed to the risk source.   
 
Results are detailed in Table 9, shown as overall probability and subsequent conditional 
probability based on whether the participant had been previously injured at an emergency 
incident.  Where results were equivalent between the two contexts they are highlighted in the 
table.  For the entire study population (represented in the “All” column) equivalence is 
highlighted in blue; equivalence amongst the previously injured group (represented in the 
“Injured” column) is highlighted in orange; and equivalence amongst the group never having 
been injured (represented in the “Never” column) is highlighted in green.    Where the 
conditional probability of risk acceptance is higher in a given scenario amongst the “Injured” 
population the cell is outlined in blue; the cell is highlighted in red when the conditional 
probability of risk acceptance is higher amongst the “Never” population. 
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Analysis revealed a probability of certainty (where probability equals 1.00) amongst the study 
group of 0.143, meaning there is a probability of 0.857 that participants did not collectively 
absolutely agree on risk tolerance attitudes or thresholds.  Further analysis revealed a 
probability of only 0.286 that all participants shared the same risk tolerance across the 
presented scenarios.  This probability increased to 0.381 amongst the “Injured” population 
whilst there was no change in the probability of agreeance amongst the “Never” population 
compared to all participants. One potential explanations for the increased consensus of risk 
acceptance amongst the “Injured” population may be that those participants whom were 
previously injured held a higher risk tolerance and therefore were more likely to undertake 
hazardous tasks that may result in injury compared to the “Never” group.   
 
Risk acceptance where the exposure was personal was equal to or higher than the risk 
acceptance where exposure was to personnel under the participant’s command in all scenarios 
with the exception of “entering a toxic smoke plume to rescue a person where there is a low or 
high probability of developing cancer” where the risk acceptance was nominally lower when 
the exposure was personal. No justification for this result could be determined with any 
certainty by the lead researcher and requires additional study.  These results suggest a tendency 
for participants to accept a higher level of risk where the consequences will not extend to other 
persons. 
 
In order to determine risk tolerance where certainty is not achieved a certainty factor was 
applied using an approach derived from Roventa and Spircu (2009). Results of this analysis for 
each scenario are provided in Table 9.  When considering risk tolerance with limited certainty 
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the probability of risk tolerance agreement between personal and personnel exposure increased 
to from 0.143 to 0.761 across the entire study population.  
 
 
Risk to Participant Themselves Risk to Personnel Under the 
Command of the Participant 
Risk Tolerance Acceptable  Unacceptable Acceptable  Unacceptable 
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Entering a burning building 
to rescue a person where 
there is a low probability of 
being severely injured or 
killed. 
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Acceptable - Certain Acceptable - Certain 
Entering a burning building 
to rescue a person where 
there is a moderate 
probability of being severely 
injured or killed. 
0.63 0.56 0.70 0.37 0.44 0.30 0.47 0.56 0.40 0.53 0.44 0.60 
Acceptable – limited certainty as 
0.65≥1.5x0.37 
Inconclusive 
Entering a burning building 
to rescue a person where 
there is a high probability of 
being severely injured or 
killed. 
0.16 0.00 0.30 0.84 1.00 0.70 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.95 1.00 0.90 
Unacceptable – limited certainty as 
0.84≥1.5x0.16 
 
 
 
Unacceptable – limited certainty as 
0.95≥1.5x0.05 
Rescuing a person from a 
vehicle where there is a low 
probability of being exposed 
to dust that may cause 
immediate lung damage.  
0.95 1.00 0.90 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.79 0.89 0.70 0.21 0.11 0.30 
Acceptable – limited certainty as 
0.95≥1.5x0.05 
Acceptable – limited certainty as 
0.79≥1.5x0.21 
Rescuing a person from a 
vehicle where there is a 
moderate probability of 
being exposed to dust that 
may cause immediate lung 
damage. 
0.47 0.56 0.40 0.53 0.44 0.60 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.68 0.67 0.70 
Inconclusive Unacceptable – limited certainty as 
0.68≥1.5x0.32 
 
 
 
Rescuing a person from a 
vehicle where there is a high 
probability of being exposed 
to dust that may cause 
immediate lung damage. 
0.37 0.33 0.40 0.63 0.67 0.60 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.79 0.78 0.80 
Unacceptable – limited certainty as 
0.63≥1.5x0.37 
 
 
 
 
 
Unacceptable – limited certainty as 
0.79≥1.5x021 
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Entering a toxic smoke 
plume to rescue a person 
where there is a low 
probability of developing 
cancer. 
0.58 0.56 0.60 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.63 0.78 0.50 0.37 0.22 0.50 
Inconclusive Acceptable – limited certainty as 
0.63≥1.5x0.37 
Entering a toxic smoke 
plume to rescue a person 
where there is a moderate 
probability of developing 
cancer. 
0.26 0.22 0.30 0.74 0.78 0.70 0.26 0.22 0.30 0.74 0.78 0.70 
Unacceptable – limited certainty as 
0.74≥1.5x0.26 
Unacceptable – limited certainty as 
0.74≥1.5x0.26 
Entering a toxic smoke 
plume to rescue a person 
where there is a high 
probability of developing 
cancer. 
0.16 0.11 0.20 0.84 0.89 0.80 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.74 0.78 0.80 
Unacceptable – limited certainty as 
0.84≥1.5x0.16 
Unacceptable – limited certainty as 
0.74≥1.5x0.26 
Rescuing a person from a 
vehicle where there is a low 
probability of being exposed 
to dust that may cause long 
term lung damage. 
0.84 0.89 0.90 0.16 0.11 0.10 0.74 1.00 0.60 0.26 0.00 0.40 
Acceptable – limited certainty as 
0.84≥1.5x0.16 
Acceptable – limited certainty as 
0.74≥1.5x0.26 
Rescuing a person from a 
vehicle where there is a 
moderate probability of 
being exposed to dust that 
may cause long term lung 
damage. 
0.32 0.22 0.40 0.68 0.78 0.60 0.26 0.22 0.30 0.74 0.78 0.70 
Unacceptable – limited certainty as 
0.68≥1.5x0.32 
Unacceptable – limited certainty as 
0.74≥1.5x0.26 
Rescuing a person from a 
vehicle where there is a high 
probability of being exposed 
to dust that may cause long 
term lung damage. 
0.21 0.22 0.20 0.79 0.78 0.80 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.79 0.78 0.80 
Unacceptable – limited certainty as 
0.79≥1.5x0.21 
Unacceptable – limited certainty as 
0.79≥1.5x0.21 
 Entering a burning building 
to rescue a child where there 
is a low probability of being 
severely injured or killed. 
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Acceptable - Certain Acceptable - Certain 
Entering a burning building 
to rescue a child where there 
is a moderate probability of 
being severely injured or 
killed. 
0.79 0.67 0.90 0.21 0.33 0.10 0.53 0.67 0.40 0.47 0.33 0.60 
Acceptable – limited certainty as 
0.79≥1.5x0.21 
Inconclusive 
Entering a burning building 
to rescue a child where there 
is a high probability of being 
severely injured or killed. 
0.21 0.11 0.30 0.79 0.89 0.70 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.89 0.89 0.90 
Unacceptable – limited certainty as 
0.79≥1.5x0.21 
Unacceptable – limited certainty as 
0.89≥1.5x0.11 
Entering a burning building 
to rescue a colleague where 
there is a low probability of 
being severely injured or 
killed. 
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.95 1.00 0.90 0.05 0.00 0.10 
Acceptable - Certain Acceptable – limited certainty as 
0.95≥1.5x0.05 
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Entering a burning building 
to rescue a colleague where 
there is a moderate 
probability of being severely 
injured or killed. 
0.79 0.67 0.90 0.21 0.33 0.10 0.63 0.78 0.50 0.37 0.22 0.50 
Acceptable – limited certainty as 
0.79≥1.5x0.21 
Acceptable – limited certainty as 
0.63≥1.5x0.37 
Entering a burning building 
to rescue a colleague where 
there is a high probability of 
being severely injured or 
killed. 
 
0.37 0.33 0.40 0.63 0.67 0.60 0.16 0.22 0.10 0.84 0.78 0.90 
Unacceptable – limited certainty as 
0.63≥1.5x0.37 
Unacceptable – limited certainty as 
0.84≥1.5x0.16 
 Entering a burning building 
to save the property where 
there is a low probability of 
being severely injured or 
killed. 
0.84 0.78 0.90 0.16 0.22 0.10 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.32 0.33 0.30 
Acceptable – limited certainty as 
0.84≥1.5x0.16 
Acceptable – limited certainty as 
0.68≥1.5x0.16 
Entering a burning building 
to save the property where 
there is a moderate 
probability of being severely 
injured or killed. 
0.16 0.11 0.20 0.84 0.89 0.80 0.16 0.22 0.10 0.84 0.78 0.90 
Unacceptable – limited certainty as 
0.84≥1.5x0.16 
Unacceptable – limited certainty as 
0.84≥1.5x0.16 
Entering a burning building 
to save the property where 
there is a high probability of 
being severely injured or 
killed. 
0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Unacceptable - Certain Unacceptable - Certain 
Table 9:  Risk tolerance. 
Risk acceptance with limited certainty was also higher for the entire study population and sub 
populations where life involvement was present.  Participants would typically put both their 
own safety and the safety of personnel under their command at increased risk to facilitate 
occupant rescue (from all risk sources).  This risk acceptance with limited certainty increased 
marginally where rescue was of a colleague, particularly when risk was transferred from the 
participant to those under the participant’s control.  Marginal increase in risk threshold was 
observed between personal and personnel exposure where rescue involved a child as opposed 
to an adult.  Whilst it is hypothesised this increase may be a result of perceived community 
expectations (as detailed in Table 8), further investigation is required to confirm this 
proposition. 
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Risk acceptance with limited certainty declined quickly for the protection of property, whilst 
the level of certainty decreased as the lead time to the realisation of potential consequences 
increased. For example, the certainty regarding risk acceptance involving acute impacts such 
as trauma was generally higher compared to those involving cancer or lung disease.  This 
suggest participants were more likely to be concerned with impacts they can witness 
immediately and is supported by the findings of Penney (2013). 
 
Descriptive analysis of the results illustrated in Table 9 provide a mean probability of 0.529 
(standard deviation of 0.336) that the entire survey group will agree on the acceptability of any 
given situation where the risk is personal in nature.  By comparison a mean probability of 0.449 
(standard deviation of 0.321) that the entire survey group will agree on the acceptability of any 
given situation where the risk is to personnel under the participant’s command.   This further 
supports the findings that participants were more likely to accept risk when they believed the 
consequences were limited to themselves. 
 
 
Analysis of the results of phase one can be summarised as: 
1. Participants demonstrated limited tendency towards a higher risk threshold than those 
described in the DGLC (2008, 2013) philosophies when occupant or rescuer life 
involvement was under threat; 
2. Participants overwhelming demonstrated a detailed understanding of hazard mitigation 
at dynamic emergency incidents through the appropriate use of controls and a 
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culturalised understanding of risk. However, this understanding did not extend to the 
definition of risk or risk management process defined in AS31000; 
3. Whilst all participants recognised the requirement to continually reassess controls 
applied to hazards during dynamic emergency incidents, participants did not 
collectively demonstrate an understanding that the risk management process is a single 
process that must be repeated at regular intervals as required by the nature of the 
incident; 
4. The majority of participants expressed a belief they were subject to external 
expectations that emergency personnel would risk their lives to protect other people 
and had a moral obligation to do so; 
5. A lesser majority of participants expressed a belief they were subject to external 
expectations that emergency personnel would risk their lives to protect property; 
6. Significant variance was observed between organisational and participant attitudes 
regarding consequence severity; 
7. In the absence of documented organisational risk thresholds for dynamic emergency 
incidents, there was limited certainty amongst participants in regards to determining 
risk acceptance.  Further, the level of agreement varied depending on whether the risk 
was personal in nature or applicable to the personnel under the participant’s command; 
8. Risk acceptance was the highest during life involvement situations and marginally 
higher again where the life under threat was either a child or a colleague.  Risk 
acceptance declined quickly where life involvement did not occur; and 
9. The level of certainty regarding risk acceptance decreased as the lead time to the 
realisation of potential consequences increased.  For example the certainty regarding 
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risk acceptance involving acute impacts such as trauma was generally higher compared 
to those involving cancer or lung disease.   
 
4.2 Phase Two 
 
The objective of phase two of the study was to analyse available data to provide enhanced 
understanding of risk sources during dynamic emergency incidents.  This analysis would 
facilitate enhanced awareness of the internal context of emergency operations by incident 
controllers as part of the risk management process. 
 
 
Initial analysis enabled the calculation of conditional probability given a reportable incident 
occurs (B) and likelihood on the basis of activity, risk source and nature of injury reported.  
The results are detailed in Tables 10-12.  Each table is ordered on the basis of frequency. 
 
Activity (A) Count P(A|B) 
Occurrence 
per year 
Likelihood 
Firefighting 327 0.491 21.800 Almost certain 
RCR 110 0.165 7.333 Almost certain 
Bushfire fighting 99 0.149 6.600 Almost certain 
Rescue 36 0.054 2.400 Almost certain 
Driving 30 0.045 2.000 Almost certain 
Breathing Apparatus 20 0.030 1.333 Almost certain 
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Suicide Response 15 0.023 1.000 Almost certain 
Hazmat 12 0.018 0.800 Moderate 
Environmental 8 0.012 0.533 Moderate 
DBA 5 0.008 0.333 Moderate 
Not reported 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
Storm 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
Table 10:  Analysis by activity. 
Risk source (A) Count P(A|B) 
Occurrence 
per year 
Likelihood 
Physical Strain 215 0.323 14.333 Almost certain 
Exposure - asbestos 120 0.180 8.000 Almost certain 
Exposure - psychological 95 0.143 6.333 Almost certain 
Impact 49 0.074 3.267 Almost certain 
Exposure - smoke 37 0.056 2.467 Almost certain 
Exposure - biohazard 24 0.036 1.600 Almost certain 
Exposure - hazmat fire 24 0.036 1.600 Almost certain 
Equipment failure 21 0.032 1.400 Almost certain 
Exposure - chemical 20 0.030 1.333 Almost certain 
Thermal 16 0.024 1.067 Likely 
Operator error 11 0.017 0.733 Moderate 
Animal 7 0.011 0.467 Moderate 
Communications 5 0.008 0.333 Moderate 
Environmental 4 0.006 0.267 Moderate 
Impaired Vision 4 0.006 0.267 Moderate 
Other person 4 0.006 0.267 Moderate 
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Blast/Explosion 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
Entrapment 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
Exposure - noise 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
Violence 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
Electrical 1 0.002 0.067 Rare 
Not reported 1 0.002 0.067 Rare 
Table 11:  Analysis by risk source. 
 
Nature of injury (A) Count P(A|B) 
Occurrence 
per year 
Likelihood 
Inhalation 163 0.245 10.867 Almost certain 
Psychological 96 0.144 6.400 Almost certain 
Nil 70 0.105 4.667 Almost certain 
Back 56 0.084 3.733 Almost certain 
Knee 42 0.063 2.800 Almost certain 
Eye 32 0.048 2.133 Almost certain 
Heat illness 30 0.045 2.000 Almost certain 
Shoulder 26 0.039 1.733 Almost certain 
Leg 16 0.024 1.067 Almost certain 
General 15 0.023 1.000 Likely 
Head / spinal 13 0.020 0.867 Likely 
Ankle  11 0.017 0.733 Moderate 
Arm 11 0.017 0.733 Moderate 
Finger 9 0.014 0.600 Moderate 
Face 8 0.012 0.533 Moderate 
Foot 8 0.012 0.533 Moderate 
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Multiple 8 0.012 0.533 Moderate 
Neck 8 0.012 0.533 Moderate 
Hand 7 0.011 0.467 Moderate 
Elbow 6 0.009 0.400 Moderate 
Ear 5 0.008 0.333 Moderate 
Absorption 4 0.006 0.267 Moderate 
Not reported 4 0.006 0.267 Moderate 
Wrist 4 0.006 0.267 Moderate 
Chest 3 0.005 0.200 Unlikely 
Groin 3 0.005 0.200 Unlikely 
Hip  3 0.005 0.200 Unlikely 
Abdominal 2 0.003 0.133 Unlikely 
Ingestion 2 0.003 0.133 Rare 
Thermal 1 0.002 0.067 Rare 
Table 12:  Analysis by injury. 
By frequency, firefighting was almost three times more likely to result in a reportable event 
compared to any other activity with an occurrence of 21.8 times per year.  Road crash rescue 
(RCR) response resulted in 7.3 reportable events per year whilst bushfire fighting resulted in 
6.6 reportable incidents per year.  This result suggest additional attention should be provided 
in training personnel and developing suitable risk mitigation procedures the activities most 
likely to give rise to a reportable incident. 
 
In terms of risk source, Physical Strain is almost 1.8 times more likely to result in a reportable 
event compared to other risk sources.  This is consistent with the physically demanding nature 
of firefighting reported by DFES (2013b) and is comparable to overexertion/strain injury rates 
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in United States firefighters reported by FEMA (2011).  The high rate of reportable events 
resulting from Physical Strain is significant as physical strain may be in part preventable 
through the implementation of a suitable physical fitness program. Winter et al. (2010, p235) 
conclude however that any such program “must be positive and not punitive in design; require 
mandatory participation by all uniformed personnel; allow for age, gender, and position in the 
department; allow for on-duty-time participation utilizing facilities provided by the 
department; provide for rehabilitation and remedial support for those in need; and contain 
training and education components.” 
 
Exposure to various hazards including asbestos, chemicals and biohazards collectively 
accounts for more reports than any other risk source (total of 225 incidents with a conditional 
probability of 0.338).  Such exposures are impossible to eradicate due to the inherent nature of 
all hazards emergency response.  However the likelihood of adverse outcomes can be in part 
mitigated through procedural and tactical measures.  Such an approach is best illustrated using 
a bow tie analysis (Robinson et al, 2010) as shown in Figure 5.  In this manner both pre-
exposure and post exposure controls or barriers can be implemented holistically to reduce the 
likelihood and severity of adverse consequences.  The bow tie analysis also facilitates the 
illustration of relationships between various barriers.  Figure 5 provides a simple example of 
this in the firefighting context.  Where a relationship exists between barriers, the influence of 
the preceding barrier may be either agonistic or antagonistic on the effectiveness of the 
following barrier.  For example, inappropriate or insufficient research and data may lead to 
inappropriate organisational policy.  This in turn can result in inappropriate training which will 
ultimately weaken risk management at all operational and organisational levels.  The combined 
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effect of the barriers and intrinsic relationships can ultimately affect the severity of realised 
consequences. 
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Figure 5: Simplified bow tie contextualised to firefighting operations 
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Just as firefighting is extremely physically demanding, it is also psychologically demanding 
with exposure to psychological trauma identified as the second most common risk source 
resulting in reportable events.  Carll (2007) and Trappler (2014) concur that care must be taken 
in addressing exposures of a psychological nature in firefighting which are unique to the 
emergency service profession.  Just as education, awareness and resilience training is important 
prior to exposure, specific psychological management programs and counselling are required 
post exposure.   
 
Analysis by injury yields results that in limited circumstances appear to conflict with other 
available data sets.  Inhalation ‘injuries’ are the most probable of all classified injuries to occur. 
However, this may be explained by the fact that all incidences of “inhalation” of smoke or other 
chemicals that were reported are captured in this category, regardless of whether acute injury 
occurred.  Psychological ‘injuries’ were the second most common reported injuries and this is 
consistent with the analysis of risk source data.  Surprisingly thermal injuries, being those 
resulting from heat transfer were the least probable (0.002 conditional probability).  This 
conflicts with data reported by FEMA (2011, 2012) which identifies a significantly higher 
thermal injury occurrence rate.  The calculated figure may be lower than the actual number of 
injuries as a result of thermal impacts as it is suggested that many incidents may remain 
unreported (DFES Health and Safety Services, 2015). The probability of “Nil” injuries 
occurring represents “Near Misses” where no injury was actually sustained and is the third 
highest amongst reported injuries sustained.  Again this figure may be lower than the actual 
number of near misses that occur during incidents due to the lack of report completion when 
near misses occur. 
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Tables 13 to 24 report the conditional probability of a specific injury occurring given an injury 
occurs during the specified activity.   Across all activities, the “Nil” injury or ‘near miss’ is 
prevalent.  This is consistent with previous findings and suggests a large number of incidents 
occur with the potential to cause injury but do not actually cause injury in the specific case 
reported.  Psychological injuries are also well represented throughout the reports, particularly 
where the potential or realisation of human trauma is present (for instance Road Crash Rescue 
and Suicide Response).  In the case of reported injuries during Suicide Response it is suggested 
it is likely the “Not Reported” values should actually also be psychological injuries but have 
not been documented as such in the relevant reports.   
 
Injury 
Conditional 
Probability 
Nil 0.300 
Back 0.150 
Knee 0.150 
Head / spinal 0.100 
Heat illness 0.100 
Neck 0.100 
Ankle  0.050 
Shoulder 0.050 
Table 13:  Conditional probability of specific injury during Breathing Apparatus operations. 
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Injury 
Conditional 
Probability 
Eye 0.253 
Knee 0.141 
Nil 0.131 
Back 0.081 
Inhalation 0.061 
Leg 0.061 
Ankle  0.051 
Shoulder 0.051 
Foot 0.030 
Heat illness 0.030 
Finger 0.020 
Neck 0.020 
Arm 0.010 
Chest 0.010 
Elbow 0.010 
Face 0.010 
Multiple 0.010 
Psychological 0.010 
Wrist 0.010 
Table 14:  Conditional probability of specific injury during Bushfire operations. 
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Injury 
Conditional 
Probability 
Eye 0.800 
Knee 0.200 
Table 15:  Conditional probability of specific injury during Direct Brigade Alarm response. 
 
Injury 
Conditional 
Probability 
Nil 0.800 
Back 0.033 
Ear 0.033 
Leg 0.033 
Psychological 0.033 
Shoulder 0.033 
Wrist 0.033 
Table 16:  Conditional probability of specific injury during Driving operations. 
 
Injury 
Conditional 
Probability 
Finger 0.375 
Nil 0.250 
Arm 0.125 
Elbow 0.125 
Heat illness 0.125 
Table 17:  Conditional probability of specific injury resulting from Environment related 
incidents. 
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Injury 
Conditional 
Probability 
Inhalation 0.434 
Back 0.092 
Heat illness 0.067 
Knee 0.064 
Nil 0.064 
Shoulder 0.046 
Head / spinal 0.034 
Leg 0.028 
Arm 0.024 
Multiple 0.018 
Foot 0.015 
Hand 0.015 
Ear 0.012 
Psychological 0.012 
Ankle  0.009 
Elbow 0.009 
Eye 0.009 
Finger 0.009 
Neck 0.009 
Abdominal 0.006 
Chest 0.006 
Hip  0.006 
Face 0.003 
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Groin 0.003 
Thermal 0.003 
Table 18:  Conditional probability of specific injury during Firefighting operations. 
 
Injury 
Conditional 
Probability 
General 0.500 
Inhalation 0.417 
Heat illness 0.083 
Table 19:  Conditional probability of specific injury during Hazardous Materials operations. 
 
Injury 
Conditional 
Probability 
Knee 0.500 
Psychological 0.500 
Table 20:  Conditional probability of specific injury during operations not specified (Not 
Reported). 
 
Injury 
Conditional 
Probability 
Psychological 0.600 
Back 0.100 
General 0.082 
Face 0.045 
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Absorption 0.018 
Inhalation 0.018 
Shoulder 0.018 
Ankle  0.009 
Arm 0.009 
Finger 0.009 
Groin 0.009 
Hand 0.009 
Heat illness 0.009 
Hip  0.009 
Ingestion 0.009 
Knee 0.009 
Multiple 0.009 
Neck 0.009 
Nil 0.009 
Wrist 0.009 
Table 21:  Conditional probability of specific injury during Road Crash Rescue operations. 
 
Injury 
Conditional 
Probability 
Psychological 0.306 
Inhalation 0.194 
Back 0.083 
Nil 0.083 
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Absorption 0.056 
Shoulder 0.056 
Ankle  0.028 
Elbow 0.028 
Groin 0.028 
Hand 0.028 
Ingestion 0.028 
Knee 0.028 
Not reported 0.028 
Wrist 0.028 
Table 22:  Conditional probability of specific injury during Rescue (other than RCR) 
operations. 
 
Injury 
Conditional 
Probability 
Face 0.500 
Inhalation 0.500 
Table 23:  Conditional probability of specific injury during Storm operations. 
 
Injury 
Conditional 
Probability 
Psychological 0.800 
Not reported 0.200 
Table 24:  Conditional probability of specific injury during Suicide Response operations. 
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Analysis reveals thermal injuries account for a relatively insignificant conditional probability 
of only 0.003 during Firefighting activities only.  No thermal burns are reported during 
Bushfire or other response.  This is in stark contradiction to the probability of thermal injuries 
in United States statistics (FEMA, 2012).  However, it is hypothesised that this may be in part 
due to under reporting of thermal injuries, due to thermal injuries being referred to as injuries 
to specific body parts without reference to the burn trauma or differences in firefighting tactics 
between Australia and the United States which may result in different mechanisms and 
frequencies of injury.  
 
For example, inhalation injuries appear over-represented in the data which is considered 
surprising given the significant respiratory protection available to responding crews (DFES 
2012a, 2012b, 2015a,).  Analysis of the report descriptions suggests that a significant 
proportion of inhalation exposures are due to incorrect fitting respiratory protection that do not 
provide adequate seals.  This has recently been in part rectified through the implementation of 
full face respirators (DFES, 2015e).  The conditional probability of heat illness occurrence also 
warrants attention with prevalence amongst all operations and responses that require the 
responder to wear structural firefighting Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and require 
significant physical effort. 
 
Review of the conditional probabilities detailed above can assist incident controllers having 
enhanced evidence based awareness of potential consequences and likelihoods prior to their 
occurrence during an emergency incident.  Analysis of the conditional probability of injury 
given an injury occurs during each of the specific operations will also facilitate the review and 
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improvement of strategic and tactical planning; personnel relief requirements; the potential 
effectiveness of PPE; and even guide the potential development of targeted prophylactic 
physical training programs. 
 
Tables 25 to 36 provide perhaps some of the most beneficial data to facilitate the development 
of evidence based risk mitigation strategies prior to and on the incident ground.  Physical Strain 
recurrently accounts for high, if not the highest, level of Risk Source giving rise to a reportable 
incident across nearly all activities.  This finding is consistent with the previous results of both 
this study and FEMA (2011) and reaffirms the notion that firefighting is extremely physical in 
nature (DFES, 2013b; Penney, 2013).  It is suggested that a lack of physical wellness may be 
the primary contributor to reportable incidents as a result of Physical Strain.  For example, 
Moore-Merrell et al. (2008) observed that physical strain was the second highest contributing 
factor to firefighter injury in the United States (the first being a lack of situational awareness).   
 
Initiating Event 
Conditional 
Probability 
Physical Strain 0.550 
Impact 0.150 
Entrapment 0.100 
Equipment 
failure 
0.100 
Communications 0.050 
Electrical 0.050 
Table 25:  Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during 
Breathing Apparatus operations. 
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Initiating Event 
Conditional 
Probability 
Physical Strain 0.515 
Exposure - 
smoke 
0.253 
Exposure - 
chemical 
0.061 
Impact 0.051 
Thermal 0.051 
Exposure - 
asbestos 
0.030 
Equipment 
failure 
0.020 
Exposure - 
psychological 
0.010 
Violence 0.010 
Table 26:  Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during Bushfire 
fighting operations. 
 
Initiating Event 
Conditional 
Probability 
Impact 0.600 
Exposure - 
chemical 
0.400 
Table 27:  Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during Direct 
Brigade Alarm response. 
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Initiating Event 
Conditional 
Probability 
Operator error 0.300 
Equipment 
failure 
0.267 
Environmental 0.133 
Impaired Vision 0.133 
Other person 0.133 
Exposure - 
psychological 
0.033 
Table 28:  Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during Driving 
operations. 
 
Initiating Event 
Conditional 
Probability 
Animal 0.875 
Physical Strain 0.125 
Table 29:  Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during 
Environment related incidents. 
 
Initiating Event 
Conditional 
Probability 
Physical Strain 0.358 
Exposure - 
asbestos 
0.315 
Impact 0.104 
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Exposure - 
hazmat fire 
0.073 
Exposure - 
smoke 
0.037 
Thermal 0.034 
Equipment 
failure 
0.024 
Communications 0.012 
Exposure - 
chemical 
0.009 
Exposure - 
psychological 
0.009 
Blast/Explosion 0.006 
Exposure - noise 0.006 
Operator error 0.006 
Not reported 0.003 
Violence 0.003 
Table 30:  Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during 
Firefighting operations. 
 
Initiating Event 
Conditional 
Probability 
Exposure - 
chemical 
0.583 
Exposure - 
asbestos 
0.333 
Physical Strain 0.083 
Table 31:  Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during 
Hazardous Materials operations. 
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Initiating Event 
Conditional 
Probability 
Exposure - 
psychological 
0.500 
Physical Strain 0.500 
Table 32:  Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during 
operations Not Recorded. 
 
Initiating Event 
Conditional 
Probability 
Exposure - 
psychological 
0.600 
Physical Strain 0.209 
Exposure - 
biohazard 
0.164 
Exposure - 
asbestos 
0.018 
Impact 0.009 
Table 33:  Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during Road 
Crash Rescue operations. 
 
Initiating Event 
Conditional 
Probability 
Exposure - 
psychological 
0.306 
Physical Strain 0.278 
Exposure - 
asbestos 
0.194 
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Exposure - 
biohazard 
0.111 
Impact 0.056 
Equipment 
failure 
0.028 
Exposure - 
chemical 
0.028 
Table 34:  Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during Rescue 
(other than RCR) operations. 
 
Initiating Event 
Conditional 
Probability 
Exposure - 
asbestos 
0.500 
Impact 0.500 
Table 35:  Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during Storm 
response. 
 
Initiating Event 
Conditional 
Probability 
Exposure - 
psychological 
0.800 
Exposure - 
biohazard 
0.133 
Exposure - 
chemical 
0.067 
Table 36:  Conditional probability of specific initiating events (Risk Sources) during Suicide 
Response operations. 
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Psychological Exposure was also well represented in the data, particularly amongst incident 
response involving human life and trauma including Road Crash Rescue and Suicide Response.  
This again supports previous findings of the study. 
 
Exposure to various contaminants was also again prevalent throughout the majority of fields.  
This may be significant as the potential effects may be mitigated through appropriate strategic 
and tactical response; appropriate PPE and suitable decontamination procedures (DFES, 2015a, 
2015b). 
 
Breathing Apparatus operations are amongst the most hazardous of all firefighting activities, 
involving the use of self-contained breathing apparatus in atmospheres not conducive to life 
due to the presence of smoke, heat, oxygen deficiency and/or excessive temperature (DFES, 
2015b).  During Breathing Apparatus operations teams of two firefighters will work in close 
proximity or inside burning structures and typically rely on a single line of firefighting hose 
for fire protection.  The margin for error is therefore understandably narrow and the potential 
severity of consequences comparatively high (as reported in Table 37).  Operations are 
extremely physical in nature and this is represented by a conditional probability of 0.55 that 
the responsible risk source for the reportable event will be Physical Strain.  Analysis also 
revealed a conditional probability of Impacts being the responsible risk source for the 
reportable incident of 0.15.  It is suggested Impacts (as opposed to Explosion / Blasts) are more 
likely to occur within the burning structure and subsequently this figure may be reduced 
through the defining of organisational risk acceptance thresholds.  In turn, this would facilitate 
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a reduction in the potential for incident controllers committing crews to internal firefighting in 
the absence of life involvement because of a perceived internal or external obligation to do so. 
 
Consequence Severity Actual Potential 
Insignificant 0.300 0.000 
Minor 0.700 0.150 
Moderate 0.000 0.400 
Major 0.000 0.250 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.200 
Table 37:  Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during 
Breathing Apparatus operations. 
Tables 37 to 48 provide comparison between actual reported consequence severity and 
potential consequence severity for each Activity.  Analysis reveals the conditional probability 
of moderate to catastrophic potential consequence severity is higher than actual reported 
consequence severity across all Activity groups.  This may be in part explained by the lack of 
subsequent reports or follow up detail for consequences that may have a long period of latency 
(for instance psychological exposures, exposures to contaminants) or for injuries that are 
initially reported but worsen over time.  The results of this analysis also support previous 
findings of the prevalence of “Nil” reported injuries in that there is a high conditional 
probability of ‘near misses’ in the incidents reported. 
 
Consequence Severity Actual Potential 
Insignificant 0.818 0.000 
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Minor 0.131 0.505 
Moderate 0.040 0.101 
Major 0.010 0.212 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.182 
Table 38:  Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during 
Bushfire Fighting operations. 
. 
Consequence Severity Actual Potential 
Insignificant 1.000 0.000 
Minor 0.000 0.600 
Moderate 0.000 0.000 
Major 0.000 0.400 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.000 
Table 39:  Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during Direct 
Brigade Alarm response 
 
Consequence Severity Actual Potential 
Insignificant 0.967 0.133 
Minor 0.033 0.100 
Moderate 0.000 0.100 
Major 0.000 0.167 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.500 
Table 40:  Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during 
Driving operations. 
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Consequence Severity Actual Potential 
Insignificant 0.750 0.125 
Minor 0.250 0.125 
Moderate 0.000 0.750 
Major 0.000 0.000 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.000 
Table 41:  Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during 
Environmental related incidents. 
 
Consequence Severity Actual Potential 
Insignificant 0.933 0.031 
Minor 0.034 0.147 
Moderate 0.021 0.199 
Major 0.012 0.098 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.526 
Table 42:  Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during 
Firefighting response. 
 
Consequence Severity Actual Potential 
Insignificant 1.000 0.000 
Minor 0.000 0.000 
Moderate 0.000 0.000 
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Major 0.000 0.083 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.917 
Table 43:  Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during 
Hazardous Materials response. 
 
Consequence Severity Actual Potential 
Insignificant 1.000 0.000 
Minor 0.000 0.000 
Moderate 0.000 1.000 
Major 0.000 0.000 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.000 
Table 44:  Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during 
operations Not Recorded. 
 
Consequence Severity Actual Potential 
Insignificant 0.973 0.000 
Minor 0.018 0.073 
Moderate 0.009 0.218 
Major 0.000 0.027 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.682 
Table 45:  Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during Road 
Crash Rescue Operations. 
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Consequence Severity Actual Potential 
Insignificant 0.972 0.000 
Minor 0.000 0.111 
Moderate 0.028 0.306 
Major 0.000 0.056 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.528 
Table 46:  Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during Rescue 
operations (other than Road Crash Rescue). 
 
Consequence Severity Actual Potential 
Insignificant 1.000 0.000 
Minor 0.000 0.000 
Moderate 0.000 0.000 
Major 0.000 0.500 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.500 
Table 47:  Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during Storm 
related response. 
 
Consequence Severity Actual Potential 
Insignificant 1.000 0.000 
Minor 0.000 0.133 
Moderate 0.000 0.000 
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Major 0.000 0.000 
Catastrophic 0.000 0.867 
Table 48:  Conditional probability of actual and potential consequence severity during 
Suicide Response operations. 
 
Further analysis reveals that, based on actual consequence severity, there is a conditional 
probability of zero (0.000) for a catastrophic severity consequence occurring across the entire 
Activity range.  This result is not supported by numerous international studies (FEMA, 2011, 
2012; Moore-Merrell et al., 2008) and is suggested to have occurred as a result of inadequate 
reporting of significant injuries.  By comparison, a mean potential catastrophic severity 
consequence conditional probability across all Activities of 0.408 (Standard deviation of 0.328) 
was calculated.  These results represent a significant potential for increased severe injury, 
permanent disability and even death amongst the study group and must be considered in the 
establishment of the internal context for risk management during dynamic emergency 
operations.  
 
 
Analysis of the results of phase two can be summarised as: 
1. Results must be interpreted with some caution.  It is suggested current recording 
processes do not provide sufficient data to accurately determine the realisation of injury 
or illness with extended latency (psychological trauma for instance).  Current recording 
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processes also do not provide for accumulation injuries as a result of repetitious 
exposure, with injuries being assigned to a single event; 
2. It is almost certain that a reportable event will occur during the majority of types of 
incident response.  This is consistent with the notion that firefighting is an inherently 
dangerous occupation; 
3. Physical strain is the highest cause of reportable event all Activities considered.  This 
is consistent with international data (FEMA, 2011; Merrill-Moore et al., 2008); 
4. Different Activities are associated with differing injury probabilities.  Whilst this study 
provides limited analysis of the results further study in this area may facilitate the 
development of targeted mitigation strategies during preparation for, and response to, 
specific emergency incidents in order reduce the occurrence of certain adverse 
outcomes; 
5. Exposure to various contaminants is prevalent across all Activity groups.  This is 
consistent with the nature of firefighters responding to a large range of firefighting, 
rescue and hazardous materials incidents.  As the specific nature of contamination and 
/ or product identification often remains undocumented few beneficial conclusions can 
be drawn from the study data in this area.  An opportunity for future study in this area 
exists once suitable data is collected; 
6. The potential consequence is consistently greater than the actual consequence realised 
in the data analysed.  This may be explained by the mitigating effects of post event 
barriers (PPE, physical conditioning of personnel etc) or simply the personnel involved 
escaped more serious injury due to a combination of events that lead to them being 
close to as opposed to being in the direct line of impact; and 
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7. During almost all types of operational response the potential for major or catastrophic 
adverse outcomes is present.   
 
4.3 Summary 
 
There are a number of limitations that may affect the validity of the findings of this study.  
Foremost is the relatively small number of priors available for analysis and the lack of sufficient 
detail with which to complete comprehensive analysis.  Whilst all care and due diligence has 
been undertaken to the extent practicable to provide unbiased and accurate analysis, enhanced 
data sets would facilitate greater certainty of the findings reached. 
 
Another limitation is the reliance of United States statistics on which to make comparison to 
the injury data obtained as firefighting tactics may vary between Australian and American 
services.  Australian tactics, particularly in the structural fire setting may be more closely 
aligned with United Kingdom fire services, however available data for comparison was not 
found as records did not identify type of injury or activity at time of injury (DCLG, 2012).   
 
These limitations, in addition to those discussed in section 3.3.3 of this report are not fatal, but 
rather should be acknowledged when the presented conclusions are considered.   
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This research has the potential to significantly improve the process of risk management in 
dynamic emergency situations the Western Australian Department of Fire and Emergency 
Services and other emergency services throughout the world.  It achieves this by not only 
identifying inconsistencies and shortfalls of current practice, but also by identifying the 
necessary steps required in order to align risk management during emergency situations with 
AS31000.   
 
Perhaps most importantly, this research explicitly rejects any notion of the validity of “dynamic 
risk management” being a stand-alone process for managing risk during emergency situations.  
For best practice to be realised the architectural structure or process of risk management cannot 
change.  The context in which risk management is completed may vary in dynamic emergency 
situations compared to that of corporate boardrooms, however it is this unique and dynamic 
context of emergency situations that only further requires the AS31000 risk management 
process to be completed in its entirety each and every time risk is assessed and subsequently 
managed.  In order to achieve this, emergency services must first succinctly define their 
organisational risk attitudes during emergency situations (which will inevitably vary from risk 
attitudes during normal business) and educate their personnel appropriately so that it forms part 
of the subconscious and conscious incident risk management process.   
 
This education must occur at the earliest stage of a firefighter’s career to ensure appropriate 
and consistent risk contexts, tolerance and management are indoctrinated into all facets of 
emergency response.  It is only through such education that AS31000 compliant risk 
management will be able to be completed in the dynamic emergency environment, not only by 
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incident controllers, but by all personnel on at the incident.  This will foreseeably result in safer 
work practices, better decisions and reduced adverse outcomes for both individuals and 
organisations.           
 
 
This study has also highlighted a number of opportunities for further study in the field.  
 
Repetition of this study incorporating the entire population of incident controllers within DFES 
would allow greater analysis of current risk attitudes and may serve to enhance the definition 
of the internal DFES context. 
 
Repetition of this study using those persons or agencies that may be involved in a critical 
external review or practices, such as WorkSafe, would significantly enhance the understanding 
of the external context and expectations in which DFES operates.  This may have the additional 
benefit of enabling DFES to align internal and external risk attitudes so that conflicting 
attitudes are not found to be a source of adverse outcomes.  In this manner, even should an 
adverse outcome be realised, organisational risk attitudes would be consistent with external 
legislative requirements.  Once these attitudes are adopted and personnel appropriately 
educated this would also foreseeably lead to improved practice during dynamic emergency 
incidents.  It should be noted however that any external parties included in such as study would 
need to have a sound understanding of the DFES internal context so that findings are applicable 
to the incident ground. 
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Comparable studies in other emergency services throughout Australia will facilitate critical 
analysis of the validity of the findings of this study throughout the Australian context.  It would 
also significantly enhance the priors available for analysis of conditional probability which in 
turn would enhance the validity of findings.           
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5.0 Conclusion 
Published literature revealed significant variance in the extent of defined risk thresholds 
amongst international fire services with an almost total absence within Australian fire services.  
The literature also identified that whilst almost all emergency services acknowledged the 
importance of adaptive and responsible incident management during dynamic emergency 
operations, with the exception of the United Kingdom Fire Service, application of the AS31000 
process was at best partial and in some international cases completely abandoned.  Non-
compliances were found to be undefined organisational risk attitudes; external contexts 
remaining unacknowledged; and only partial application of the processes defined in AS31000.  
In particular, the perception that the risk management process itself changed during dynamic 
emergency operations as opposed to the process being continually repeated in its entirety with 
varying risk thresholds within the context of the environment and the dynamics of each 
individual emergency at the point in time the risk assessment is conducted must be addressed. 
 
Results of this research confirmed conclusions within the literature review.  Incident controllers 
were found to rely on professional craft knowledge evolved through their own subjective 
experiences.  Whilst historical incident management practices have arguably been effective in 
the prevention of severe injury amongst responding personnel (an average conditional 
probability of 0.893 of ‘Nil’ injury across all activities being calculated), they have arguably 
also been non-compliant with AS31000.    This may have significant implications on the 
facilitation of post incident reviews and forensic reports as it is almost certain that the 
consensus on risk acceptance by the authors of these reviews and reports will vary from that of 
the incident controller at the time of the emergency incident.   Ramifications of any non-
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compliance would only increase should a catastrophic consequence be realised and a review 
be conducted by an external party who cannot reference the internal fire service context and 
whom would rely solely on AS31000 as the required standard. 
 
Whilst historically proven to be highly effective without further definition and dissemination 
of internal contexts and risk thresholds, risk management during dynamic emergency 
operations in the Western Australian fire and emergency service is not considered currently 
compliant with AS31000. 
 
This research also highlighted the need for organisations to have defined risk acceptance 
criteria for incident controllers to reference in order to reduce the potential for individual bias 
or conflicting operational strategies between incident controllers at strategic levels and officers 
involved in tactical front line response (where the exposure transfers from personnel under the 
incident controller’s command to the personnel themselves).   
The answer may lie in several targeted responses: 
1. Enhanced reporting to facilitate information rich data with which to better define 
specific emergency services risk; 
2. Implementation of probability based risk modelling to assist evidence based risk 
management at all levels of emergency incidents; 
3. Defining and communicating DFES operational risk thresholds; and  
4. Adoption of the philosophies and processes of DCLG (2008, 2012) contextualised to 
the internal and external contexts of DFES. 
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By providing consistent risk threshold guidance throughout a firefighter’s and officer’s career 
the potential for adverse outcomes will foreseeably reduce.  Further research, improved data 
collection and ongoing review at strategic and operational levels is also essential to enhance 
dynamic incident risk management in an ongoing and AS31000 compliant basis. 
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